High 5 Hunt LeadsIOCsHavoXPhantom53Hunt.io

Open Loot Server Spills Cracked Vaults and IRS, SSA Logins

Hunt.io found a Russian-speaking crew's exposed server holding cracked LastPass and 1Password vaults and live bank, ID.me, IRS and Social Security logins stolen from 603 infected Windows PCs.

A credential-theft crew left its loot server open, and what’s inside is ugly. Hunt.io says an exposed directory on a Netherlands VPS held cracked LastPass and 1Password vaults, decrypted Chrome and Edge passwords, and live logins for Chase, Capital One, Citi, Wells Fargo, ID.me, Login.gov, the IRS and Social Security. The operator’s own logs show 603 implants checking in between Oct. 12 and Nov. 8, 2026. None of the banks or agencies was breached: the theft happened on victims’ own Windows PCs, underneath their password managers and MFA.

For defenders

The toolkit: a Python implant (.pyw, run windowless by pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming\[hex]\) beacons to a custom C2 called HavoX, with a Go task broker (Phantom53) and a Russian-language relay (“krint”) feeding an outside panel. All victim traffic is fronted by 12 Cloudflare Workers subdomains, T1059.006 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python) and T1090.002 (Proxy: External Proxy). Hunt.io doesn’t detail how the implant first lands.

What it steals: PowerShell grabbers (w_grab.ps1, kb_grab.ps1) copy browser profiles, LastPass extension storage and live KeePass databases, then upload them to port 8125. Offline scripts break Chrome v20/v21 app-bound encryption with hardcoded keys and crack LastPass and 1Password vaults, T1555.003 (Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers) and T1555.005 (Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers). Other scripts grab session files for 35 AI developer tools (Claude, Codex, Gemini CLI auth files among them) and sweep seven crypto wallet extensions.

MFA bypass: stolen ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT cookies were replayed in a PKCE OAuth flow with prompt=none to get Microsoft Graph tokens without a login or MFA prompt; Hunt.io found two compromised Microsoft 365 tenants, T1550.004 (Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie). For staying power, the operator pushes Level.io and ScreenConnect agents, T1219 (Remote Access Tools).

Attribution: Russian comments and log prose run through 249 of the files. That’s a language finding, not a country attribution. No CVE is involved.

Network
145.63.138[.]67 (primary C2 and loot server; ports 8000, 8080, 8082, 8124, 8125, 8126)
66.165.246[.]77:11603 (secondary exfiltration)
146.70.24[.]172 (external Kraken panel)
188.137.236[.]209 (operator login to HavoX, per hv.log)
sync-node-serv[.]com (one-time task URLs, :8080/t/[token])
3k7d7v5hn.workers[.]dev
bog1hav1ged3-1jtn.workers[.]dev
busykifukek2-8psk.workers[.]dev
fep0bupuhag2-o0kk.workers[.]dev
fypahedupal2-0maz.workers[.]dev
j1nanyd1jot2-lwml.workers[.]dev
l0mad1fugiv2-7mtj.workers[.]dev
nelol0k0tys3-jbne.workers[.]dev
sekolonozus3-erij.workers[.]dev
tej0kygaj0g3-tad7.workers[.]dev
vajowigus0p3-yw4k.workers[.]dev
zetogebuw1s2-5hzu.workers[.]dev

Host
%APPDATA%\[hex]\[hex].pyw launched by pythonw.exe (HavoX implant)
%TEMP%\wg\ (browser data staging before tar upload)
Implant protocol fields: BuildID 4444444, MagicValue 0xdeadbeef
Scripts: w_grab.ps1 ; kb_grab.ps1 ; ai_grab.ps1 ; prec_ai*.ps1 ; prec_inv.ps1 ; ph_grab.ps1 ; seed_scan_asvk.ps1

Hunt.io published no file hashes.

What it means for you

A password manager and MFA protect you from phishing sites and reused passwords. They can’t protect you once malware is running on your own PC, because it can copy the vault and the “stay signed in” cookies that let it skip the MFA prompt. That’s what happened here, to dozens of people with bank, IRS and Social Security logins. If you run on Windows and install software from outside official stores, this is the risk.

Do this now

  1. Only install software from the vendor’s own site or the Microsoft Store, and keep Windows’ built-in antivirus switched on.
  2. Use a passkey or a hardware security key for your bank, email and ID.me or Login.gov where offered; stolen passwords alone won’t open those.
  3. If your PC was ever infected, sign out of all sessions everywhere, change your master password from a clean device, and then change the important passwords inside the vault.
  4. Developers: treat AI CLI auth files (~/.claude/.credentials.json, ~/.codex/auth.json, ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json) like SSH keys and revoke them after any infection.

Source article: US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation
Publisher: Hunt.io
Published: Nov. 18, 2026
URL: https://hunt.io/blog/us-bank-irs-ssa-logins-stolen-russian-speaking-operator

Executive Summary

Hunt.io found an exposed open directory (1,692 files, about 1.11 GB, on port 8124) on a Podaon SIA VPS at 145.63.138[.]67 (AS211381, Netherlands), flagged on Oct. 20 and Nov. 2, 2026, belonging to an unnamed Russian-speaking credential-theft operator; Hunt.io gives the operator no group name, and the attribution rests on Russian-language comments, docstrings and log prose across 249 files. The server ran three custom C2 components in parallel: HavoX, a Python (uvicorn/WebSocket) implant manager on port 8000 behind a Russian-language login page; Phantom53, a Go task broker and fleet manager the operator calls “adminka”, backed by /opt/phantom53/data/c2.sqlite3 on port 8080; and the Kraken bridge (“krint”), which relays tasks to an external panel at 146.70.24[.]172 as single-use URLs on sync-node-serv[.]com. Over a 27-day window (Oct. 12 to Nov. 8, 2026) the logs record 603 implants on 469 hostnames and 1.24 million beacons, all fronted by 12 Cloudflare Workers subdomains. The implant is a windowless .pyw script run by pythonw.exe from AppData\Roaming; Hunt.io maps initial access to phishing but does not describe the lure. Once a host beacons, the operator layers PowerShell grabbers for browser profiles, LastPass extension storage, live KeePass databases and the session files of 35 AI developer tools, decrypts Chrome v20/v21 app-bound data offline with hardcoded keys, cracks LastPass and 1Password vaults offline, harvests financial notification emails over IMAP, sweeps crypto wallets, replays stolen ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT cookies through a prompt=none PKCE flow to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens past MFA, and installs Level.io or ScreenConnect agents for persistence. The objective is financial account takeover: at least 57 victims hold US bank or government logins and at least 46 hold ID.me, Login.gov, IRS or SSA accounts. Hunt leads, false positive expectations and indicators are detailed below; Hunt.io published no detection rules and no file hashes.

ATT&CK chain: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration

Hunt Lead Grid

Hunt Lead Level Hunt Lead Name ATT&CK Risk of False Positives
1 (Junior) HavoX Infrastructure and Workers-Front Sweep T1090.002 (Proxy: External Proxy), T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel) Low. The VPS addresses, the task domain and the 12 randomly named Workers subdomains belong to this operation; the only care needed is that workers.dev itself hosts many legitimate apps, so the match must be on the full subdomain, never the parent domain.
2 (Pro) Windowless pythonw Implant in AppData Roaming T1059.006 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python), T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder), T1564.003 (Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window) Medium. Some legitimate tools ship Python and run background scripts with pythonw.exe; the rule anchors on a .pyw file in a hex-named folder directly under AppData\Roaming, started at logon and making outbound HTTPS to workers.dev.
2 (Pro) PowerShell Grabbers for Browser, Vault and AI-Tool Secrets T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell), T1555.003 (Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers), T1555.005 (Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers), T1005 (Data from Local System) Low. Backup and sync agents read browser profiles, but they are signed binaries, not PowerShell; the rule anchors on PowerShell opening Login Data, Cookies, .kdbx files or AI CLI auth files and then running tar or curl.
2 (Pro) Unapproved Level.io and ScreenConnect Agent Installs T1219 (Remote Access Tools) Medium. Managed service providers use both products legitimately; the rule anchors on an install that doesn’t match your sanctioned RMM tenant or instance, or that is spawned by PowerShell, cmd or pythonw rather than your software-deployment tool.
3 (Elite) Silent PKCE Token Issuance From Replayed ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT T1550.004 (Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie), T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie), T1087.004 (Account Discovery: Cloud Account) Medium. Silent token refresh with prompt=none is normal for single-page apps; the correlation anchors on a non-interactive sign-in from an IP, ASN or device never seen for that user, with no matching interactive sign-in, followed by Graph directory or mailbox enumeration.

HavoX Infrastructure and Workers-Front Sweep

Every implant callback in the operator’s beacon log (serve_crash.log) arrives through one of 12 Cloudflare Workers subdomains that front the real server at 145.63.138[.]67: 3k7d7v5hn, bog1hav1ged3-1jtn, busykifukek2-8psk, fep0bupuhag2-o0kk, fypahedupal2-0maz, j1nanyd1jot2-lwml, l0mad1fugiv2-7mtj, nelol0k0tys3-jbne, sekolonozus3-erij, tej0kygaj0g3-tad7, vajowigus0p3-yw4k and zetogebuw1s2-5hzu, each under workers[.]dev. Behind them the VPS exposes HavoX on 8000, Phantom53 on 8080, a large-archive upload receiver on 8082, the open directory on 8124, the primary PUT loot receiver on 8125 (grabbers post to hxxp://145.63.138[.]67:8125/up/) and a revsocks SOCKS5 tunnel on 8126 that announces itself as AkamaiNetStorage. A secondary exfiltration path goes to 66.165.246[.]77:11603 (Hivelocity, US), the Kraken bridge reaches its panel at 146.70.24[.]172, implants fetch one-time task files from sync-node-serv[.]com:8080/t/[token] with a 30-minute lifetime, and hv.log records an operator logging into HavoX from 188.137.236[.]209. The detection is a retrospective search of DNS, proxy and firewall logs for any of those subdomains, addresses and ports, plus a search for the implant protocol values Hunt.io gives (BuildID 4444444, MagicValue 0xdeadbeef) in any proxy or TLS-inspection logs that capture POST bodies or headers.

Use DNS resolver logs, secure web gateway or proxy logs, firewall and NetFlow, and sweep back to at least Oct. 1, 2026, since the campaign window starts Oct. 12 and the server’s open directory was first flagged Oct. 20. Block the 12 full subdomains and the addresses, but do not block workers[.]dev as a whole, because many legitimate services run there; Hunt.io’s suggestion to watch for uniform POST intervals to workers.dev is a good second pass for subdomains the operator rotates in later. The 188.137.236[.]209 address is the operator’s own login source, so it is unlikely to appear in enterprise traffic and a hit deserves a close look. Any internal host that reached these indicators should be treated as fully compromised: escalate to incident response, assume every saved browser password, cookie, password-manager vault and AI tool token on it is in the operator’s hands, and rotate from a clean device.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1090.002 (Proxy: External Proxy), T1071.001 (Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols); Exfiltration → T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel), T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service) (mapping per source article)

Sources: “US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation”, Hunt.io, Nov. 18, 2026, https://hunt.io/blog/us-bank-irs-ssa-logins-stolen-russian-speaking-operator (source article)

Windowless pythonw Implant in AppData Roaming

The first-stage HavoX implant is a Python script with the .pyw extension, launched silently through pythonw.exe so no console window appears, and Hunt.io says it persists only under the pattern AppData\Roaming\[hex]\[hex].pyw. Once running it registers with HavoX, which holds a per-agent AES-256 key, and beacons on one of three sleep settings (60, 10 or 3 seconds); of 73 profiled agents, 70 were Windows 10, three were Windows 11 and only five had elevated rights, so expect it to run as the ordinary user. The detection logic is pythonw.exe (or python.exe) executing a .pyw file whose path is a hex-named folder directly under %APPDATA%, any Run key, Startup folder item or scheduled task whose command points at such a path, and pythonw.exe starting from an unusual parent (explorer at logon, a Run key, or a script host) and making outbound HTTPS connections at a steady interval.

Use EDR process and network telemetry, Sysmon event 1 (process creation), 3 (network connection) and 13 (registry value set), and an autoruns inventory. On most corporate fleets Python is rare outside developer and data-science machines, so start by listing every host where pythonw.exe ran in the last 60 days and review the script paths; legitimate tools install Python under Program Files or a named application folder, not a random hex directory in Roaming. Hash blocking won’t help because the implant is a text script; key on the path pattern and the parent process instead, and don’t block pythonw.exe itself, which developers need. A confirmed hit means the host has been in the fleet and grabbers may already have run, so escalate rather than just deleting the file. This pattern carries over to other Python-based stealers and RATs, which favor .pyw for the same hidden-window reason.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Execution → T1059.006 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python); Persistence → T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder); Defense Evasion → T1564.003 (Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window) (T1059.006 and T1547.001 per source article; the source maps the windowless launch to T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information), but running without a console window fits T1564.003 better, so both are given)

Sources: “US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation”, Hunt.io, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

PowerShell Grabbers for Browser, Vault and AI-Tool Secrets

After the implant beacons, the operator queues PowerShell collectors chosen by what the victim holds. w_grab.ps1 copies Chrome, Edge and Firefox profile files (Login Data, Cookies, History and the LastPass extension’s LevelDB storage) into %TEMP%\wg, packs them into a tar archive and uploads it with curl and a bearer token to the C2. kb_grab.ps1 opens a live KeePass database (c.kdbx) with a FileShare.ReadWrite handle so KeePass doesn’t need to close, recursively looks for other .kdbx files under 8 MB in the JetBrains folder, grabs KeePass.config.xml to learn the key-derivation settings, Base64-encodes everything and POSTs it to hxxp://145.63.138[.]67:8125/up/. Four further scripts (prec_ai*.ps1 and ai_grab.ps1) collect session files for 35 AI developer tools, including ~/.claude/.credentials.json, ~/.codex/auth.json and ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json, and upload them over port 8082; ph_grab.ps1 and prec_inv.ps1 take wallet extension data (Phantom, MetaMask, Coinbase Wallet, Trust Wallet, Rabby, Keplr, Exodus), and seed_scan_asvk.ps1 hunts for files named for seeds, phrases or backups. The actual cracking of Chrome app-bound data and LastPass and 1Password vaults happens offline on the operator’s side, so the endpoint signal is the collection. The detection logic is powershell.exe reading any browser Login Data or Cookies file, a .kdbx file, a password-manager extension’s Local Extension Settings folder, or an AI CLI auth file, especially when followed within minutes by tar.exe or curl.exe writing to or uploading from %TEMP%.

Use EDR file-access and process telemetry (or Windows object-access auditing with SACLs on the browser and AI tool credential paths), PowerShell script-block logging (event 4104) and proxy logs for the uploads. Scope first to developer and administrator workstations, which hold the KeePass databases, cloud keys and AI tool tokens this operator values most, then widen to all Windows endpoints. Allowlist only signed backup or browser-sync agents by full image path; PowerShell has no business opening these files. Blocking curl or tar outright breaks Windows tooling, so alert on the combination instead. Treat a hit as active credential theft: isolate the host, revoke every browser session and AI tool token, rotate the KeePass master password and the secrets inside, and assume the vault will be cracked offline regardless of password strength if the master password is weak or reused. The same pattern catches most infostealers that use scripted collection.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Execution → T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell); Credential Access → T1555.003 (Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers), T1555.005 (Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers); Collection → T1005 (Data from Local System) (mapping per source article, which maps the vault theft to the parent T1555 (Credentials from Password Stores); T1555.005 is the more precise sub-technique)

Sources: “US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation”, Hunt.io, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Unapproved Level.io and ScreenConnect Agent Installs

To keep access if the Python implant is found, the operator installs commercial remote management agents. add_rmm1.py writes a PowerShell payload into the Phantom53 database as a named alias, rmm1, and queues it to an implant; the payload downloads the Level MSI from downloads.level.io and installs it silently with the operator’s own Level API key embedded. sc_api.py works against ConnectWise ScreenConnect through x.screenconnect.com, trying a GET login token and then a POST login, and enumerates sessions and session groups once authenticated. On one corporate host the operator’s reconnaissance (Oct. 29, 2026) noted AnyDesk was already installed, which Hunt.io reads as the operator checking for existing remote tools before adding its own. The detection logic is an msiexec.exe install of a Level or ScreenConnect agent whose parent chain leads back to PowerShell, cmd or pythonw.exe, a new Level or ScreenConnect service on a host that isn’t enrolled in your sanctioned instance, and any outbound connection to Level or ScreenConnect cloud infrastructure from a host your IT team doesn’t manage that way.

Use EDR process and service-creation telemetry (System event 7045, Security event 4697), software inventory and proxy logs. Compare installed RMM agents against the list of products and tenant or instance IDs your organization actually uses; anything else is a finding. Don’t block downloads.level.io or screenconnect.com wholesale if your own IT or an MSP relies on them; the anchor is the parent process and the tenant, not the product. Sweep back to Oct. 1, 2026. A rogue RMM agent should be treated as a backdoor: remove it, rotate credentials on the host and look for the Python implant and the grabbers above, since the agent is only installed once the implant is already there. This lead generalises well: unsanctioned RMM installs are a common persistence step for ransomware affiliates and infostealer crews alike.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1219 (Remote Access Tools) (mapping per source article, which lists it under Persistence)

Sources: “US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation”, Hunt.io, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Silent PKCE Token Issuance From Replayed ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT

The directory held Microsoft login cookie files from two victim machines. The operator went through seven versions of a replay script (est_replay 1 through 7) that injects the stolen ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT cookie, generates a fresh PKCE code verifier and challenge on each attempt, and sends an authorization request with prompt=none, looping over three login-hint spellings of the victim’s email. Because the persistent session cookie is accepted, Entra ID returns an authorization code with no password or MFA prompt, which the script exchanges for Microsoft Graph bearer tokens; Hunt.io found four such tokens and a file (bd_tenant_rows.json) recording two compromised tenants, both traced to the same infected host, and a graph_enum.py script that lists tenant users and roles. The detection logic is a correlation in Entra ID sign-in logs: a successful non-interactive or silent authorization for a user from an IP address, ASN or device ID that has never appeared for that user, with no interactive sign-in from that location in the preceding hours, followed by Graph calls that enumerate users, roles or mail.

Join Entra ID interactive and non-interactive sign-in logs with Microsoft Graph activity logs and, where available, Defender for Cloud Apps or unified audit log mailbox events. Baseline each user’s devices and network locations; the key mismatch is a token issued to an unmanaged device or a hosting-provider ASN while the user’s real sessions come from a corporate or home ISP. Single-page apps refresh silently all day, so the device and location mismatch is the anchor, not prompt=none alone. Conditional Access with device compliance, token protection and Continuous Access Evaluation is the durable fix, as Hunt.io recommends; shortening refresh-token lifetimes helps, but resetting the password alone does not kill a stolen session, so revoke the user’s sessions and refresh tokens explicitly. Look back 30 days, the usual sign-in log retention, and escalate any match as an account compromise with an infected endpoint behind it, since the cookie had to be stolen from the user’s own browser. This detection applies to any cookie-theft operation targeting Microsoft 365, not just this one.

Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)

ATT&CK: Credential Access → T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie); Lateral Movement → T1550.004 (Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie); Discovery → T1087.004 (Account Discovery: Cloud Account) (T1539 and T1550.004 per source article; the source maps the Graph enumeration to T1087.002 (Account Discovery: Domain Account), but listing Entra ID users through Graph fits T1087.004 better, so both are given)

Sources: “US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation”, Hunt.io, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Hash Appendix

HavoX toolkit

Hunt.io published no file hashes for the implant or the scripts, and none were looked up in OTX AlienVault or VirusTotal for this report. Detect on the paths, script names, protocol values and network indicators instead.

MD5s

(not available)  # [hex].pyw -> %APPDATA%\[hex]\[hex].pyw, HavoX Python implant
(not available)  # w_grab.ps1 -> browser and LastPass extension grabber, stages in %TEMP%\wg
(not available)  # kb_grab.ps1 -> KeePass .kdbx and KeePass.config.xml grabber

SHA1s

(not available)  # [hex].pyw -> %APPDATA%\[hex]\[hex].pyw, HavoX Python implant
(not available)  # w_grab.ps1 -> browser and LastPass extension grabber, stages in %TEMP%\wg
(not available)  # kb_grab.ps1 -> KeePass .kdbx and KeePass.config.xml grabber

SHA256s

(not available)  # [hex].pyw -> %APPDATA%\[hex]\[hex].pyw, HavoX Python implant
(not available)  # w_grab.ps1 -> browser and LastPass extension grabber, stages in %TEMP%\wg
(not available)  # kb_grab.ps1 -> KeePass .kdbx and KeePass.config.xml grabber

References Appendix

  • “US Bank, IRS, and Social Security Logins Stolen by a Russian-Speaking Operation”, Hunt.io, Nov. 18, 2026, https://hunt.io/blog/us-bank-irs-ssa-logins-stolen-russian-speaking-operator

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