This Linux Miner Makes Your GPUs Swear They’re Idle
Elastic says REF3364 broke in through an exposed Ray job agent and planted SANSAR, a Linux miner with a kernel rootkit, an Ethereum-steered backdoor and a fake NVIDIA library that shows GPUs as idle.
A Linux crypto miner has found a neat way to hide on GPU servers: it makes the graphics cards report that they’re idle. The Hacker News reports that Elastic Security Labs caught a financially motivated cluster it tracks as REF3364 breaking in through an exposed Ray job agent in late October 2026, then installing a toolkit called SANSAR with a kernel rootkit, a backdoor that finds its server through an Ethereum smart contract, and a doctored NVIDIA library that tells monitoring tools the GPUs are doing nothing.
For defenders
The intrusion: the attacker submitted jobs to an exposed Ray job agent (Ray is a popular framework for distributed AI and Python workloads), first running nvidia-smi to collect and send off the GPU inventory, then a Python reverse shell: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1059.006 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python). They added an SSH key to the account’s authorized_keys: T1098.004 (Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys). After getting root, they staged everything under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module with DKMS and added an initramfs loader so it comes back on boot: T1547.006 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions). The module uses ftrace hooks to hide processes, files and sockets: T1014 (Rootkit).
The toolkit: sansar (Rust) talks to an onion C2 over Tor using Arti and the legitimate lyrebird bridge transport: T1090.003 (Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy). It picks kurt (XMRig 6.25.0) for CPUs or tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9) for GPUs, and can also launch a SYN flood: T1496.001 (Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking). A wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1 makes nvidia-smi and other tools show 0% GPU use, a temperature of 36 to 46°C and 100 to 200 W. The netns backdoor runs as a systemd service, reads its controller’s IPv4 address from Ethereum contract 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349 through public RPC services, connects on TCP 8080 and opens reverse shells on command: T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver). Turkish comments appear in the rootkit’s source; no group is named. Elastic publishes SHA-256s and two YARA rules (in the Hunt Lead report below). No CVE is involved: the Ray agent was simply exposed.
efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id[.]onionWhat it means for you
If you don’t run your own GPU servers, nothing to do here. If your company rents or owns GPU machines for AI work, this is how someone else ends up running on them at your expense: the cards look idle on your dashboard while they mine crypto, and your power or cloud bill is the only clue. The way in was a job-submission service left open to the internet, which is an easy mistake when people are rushing to get AI projects running.
Do this now
- Never expose a Ray dashboard or job API to the internet; put it behind a VPN or an allowlist and require authentication.
- Compare GPU power draw and temperatures from the hardware or your cloud provider with what nvidia-smi shows; a big mismatch is a red flag.
- Check that
libnvidia-ml.so.1matches the file your NVIDIA driver package installed. - Look for unexpected SSH keys in authorized_keys files and for a
/opt/vadi_folder on GPU hosts.
Source article: SANSAR Linux Cryptomining Malware Uses Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity
Publisher: The Hacker News
Published: Nov. 16, 2026
URL: https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware-uses.html
Executive Summary
REF3364, Elastic Security Labs’ designation for a financially motivated Linux cryptomining cluster (no other vendor aliases have been published), compromised a GPU host in late October 2026 through an exposed Ray job agent. The actor submitted Ray jobs that ran nvidia-smi to inventory and exfiltrate GPU details, then a Python reverse shell job, added an SSH key to the account’s authorized_keys file, escalated to root, staged a toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built a kernel rootkit module named acpi_thermal_mgr through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so it reloads at boot. The toolkit’s Rust orchestrator, SANSAR, takes commands over Tor (Arti with lyrebird bridges) from an onion service, launches XMRig (renamed kurt) or SRBMiner-MULTI (renamed tilki), maintains a wrapped NVIDIA Management Library that reports 0% GPU utilization with randomized temperature and power, can spawn shells and run a TCP SYN flood; the rootkit uses ftrace to hide processes, files and sockets, and a separate backdoor, netns, runs as a systemd service, resolves its controller IPv4 address from an Ethereum smart contract and opens reverse shells over TCP port 8080. The objective is compute theft on GPU and AI infrastructure with resilient, hidden access; Elastic found Turkish comments in the rootkit source but attributes it to no group. Hunt leads, false positive expectations, Elastic’s published YARA rules, indicators and SHA-256 hashes are detailed below.
ATT&CK chain: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion → Discovery → Command and Control → Impact
Hunt Lead Grid
| Hunt Lead Level | Hunt Lead Name | ATT&CK | Risk of False Positives |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (Junior) | SANSAR Toolkit Artifact and YARA Sweep | T1547.006 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions) | Low. The staging path /opt/vadi_, the acpi_thermal_mgr module name and the published hashes and YARA byte patterns have no legitimate use; the lyrebird hash is a genuine Tor Project binary and is excluded from blocking. |
| 2 (Pro) | Ray Jobs Running GPU Inventory or Reverse Shells | T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) | Medium. Data scientists legitimately run nvidia-smi and Python in Ray jobs; the lead anchors on job submissions from outside known clients and on jobs whose Python opens outbound sockets to interactive shells. |
| 2 (Pro) | Tampered NVIDIA Management Library | T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools) | Low. Driver updates replace libnvidia-ml.so.1, but always through the package manager or NVIDIA installer; the lead anchors on a library that doesn’t match its package checksum or that was written by any other process. |
| 3 (Elite) | Ethereum RPC Lookup Followed by Port 8080 Shell | T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver) | Medium. Some hosts legitimately call Ethereum RPC providers; the lead needs the sequence of a systemd service process making eth_call requests, a raw TCP connection to port 8080 shortly after, and a Bash child with a network socket. |
| 3 (Elite) | Hidden Process Cross-View and Initramfs Integrity | T1014 (Rootkit) | Medium. Short-lived processes cause transient mismatches between views; the lead anchors on processes or sockets that persist in one view and are absent from another, and on initramfs or DKMS changes outside a kernel or driver update. |
SANSAR Toolkit Artifact and YARA Sweep
After gaining root, REF3364 staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_ (with subpaths such as /opt/vadi_/tilki and /opt/vadi_/nvml-hook/), built the acpi_thermal_mgr.ko kernel module through DKMS and added an initramfs loader so the module reloads at boot. The payload names are sansar (orchestrator), kurt (XMRig 6.25.0), tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9), lyrebird (Tor pluggable transport), acpi_thermal_mgr.ko (rootkit), netns (backdoor) and a wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1, and SANSAR reaches its C2 at efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id[.]onion through Arti. The detection logic is a fleet sweep for the /opt/vadi_ path, a DKMS tree or loaded module named acpi_thermal_mgr, systemd units launching netns, files matching the SHA-256 values in the appendix, and a scan of binaries and memory with Elastic’s two YARA rules below.
Use EDR file inventory, osquery (file, kernel_modules, systemd_units tables), DKMS status output and YARA scanning of disk and process memory on Linux GPU and AI hosts, sweeping back at least to October 2026. Because the rootkit hides directories with its configured prefix and its own module entry, run the filesystem sweep from an offline mount or a rescue boot where possible, and treat a clean live result on a suspected host as inconclusive. Do not block the lyrebird hash, which is the Tor Project’s own transport binary; its presence on a GPU server is suspicious context, not proof. Any hit on /opt/vadi_ or acpi_thermal_mgr means root-level compromise: rebuild the host rather than clean it.
rule Linux_Trojan_Sansar_11eea454 {
meta:
author = "Elastic Security"
os = "Linux"
category_type = "Trojan"
family = "Sansar"
threat_name = "Linux.Trojan.Sansar"
strings:
$a1 = { 8A 0A 88 4C 24 ?? 44 8A 5C 24 ?? 8D 48 01 44 89 DB D2 EB 34 07 89 C1 41 D2 E3 41 08 DB 89 F0 83 E0 1F 46 32 1C 10 44 88 1C 37 48 FF C6 48 FF C2 }
condition:
all of them
}
rule Linux_Trojan_Netns_c94a4b17 {
meta:
author = "Elastic Security"
os = "Linux"
category_type = "Trojan"
family = "Netns"
threat_name = "Linux.Trojan.Netns"
strings:
$a1 = { 66 89 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 48 C7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 08 07 00 00 48 C7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 00 00 00 48 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 41 B8 10 00 00 00 48 89 D1 BA 14 00 00 00 BE 01 00 00 00 89 C7 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? }
condition:
all of them
}
Rules reproduced as published by Elastic Security Labs in “Linux cryptomining malware: Inside the SANSAR toolkit”.
Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)
ATT&CK: Persistence → T1547.006 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions); Command and Control → T1090.003 (Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy) (mapping per Elastic’s report)
Sources: “SANSAR Linux Cryptomining Malware Uses Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity”, The Hacker News, Nov. 16, 2026, https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware-uses.html (source article); “Linux cryptomining malware: Inside the SANSAR toolkit”, Elastic Security Labs, Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware (additional source, same campaign; paths, hashes and YARA rules)
Ray Jobs Running GPU Inventory or Reverse Shells
Initial access came through an exposed Ray job agent that let the actor submit jobs without authentication. The first jobs ran nvidia-smi to capture the GPU inventory and send it to an external server; the actor then submitted a Python reverse shell job that connected to a remote listener, and next added an SSH key to that account’s authorized_keys file for persistent access. The detection logic watches Ray job submissions and their process trees: alert on jobs submitted from source addresses outside your known client and notebook ranges, on job entrypoints that run nvidia-smi followed by an outbound connection to an unfamiliar host, on Ray worker processes spawning sh or bash with a network socket, and on authorized_keys modifications by the account the Ray service runs as.
Use Ray job submission logs from the dashboard and job API, ingress or firewall logs for the Ray dashboard and job port, and EDR or auditd process and file events on Ray head and worker nodes. Sweep back to at least October 2026 and keep the authorized_keys file-integrity rule permanent. Legitimate jobs run nvidia-smi and Python constantly, so do not alert on the binaries alone; tune on submitter origin and on the job opening an interactive shell or reaching the internet. The durable fix is to take the Ray dashboard and job API off untrusted networks; blocking nvidia-smi would break legitimate monitoring. This lead generalizes to the ShadowRay-style abuse of exposed Ray clusters reported in earlier campaigns.
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Initial Access → T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application); Execution → T1059.006 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python); Persistence → T1098.004 (Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys) (mapping per Elastic’s report)
Sources: The Hacker News (above), source article; Elastic Security Labs (above), additional source
Tampered NVIDIA Management Library
The toolkit installs a wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1 that hooks the NVML calls used by nvidia-smi and other monitoring tools, filters the miner out of process listings, reports GPU utilization as 0%, and substitutes random temperatures between 36 and 46°C and power draw between 100 and 200 W; SANSAR itself handles maintenance of this NVML hook, with build material under /opt/vadi_/nvml-hook/. The detection logic is integrity checking of the NVML library: compare every libnvidia-ml.so.1 on disk against the checksum recorded by the NVIDIA driver package or installer, alert on writes to that file by any process other than the package manager or driver installer, and flag NVML readings that sit inside those exact random ranges with near-zero utilization while host power or GPU fan telemetry from an out-of-band source shows load.
Use package verification (rpm -V or dpkg –verify against the driver package), file-integrity monitoring on driver library paths, EDR file-write events, and, for the correlation, BMC or IPMI power telemetry or cloud provider GPU metrics that don’t depend on the host’s NVML. Hash-blocking the wrapped library alone is weak because it is built per host; the package-checksum mismatch is the durable signal. Treat a mismatch as a compromised host with root access and hand it to incident response. ATT&CK mapping for this lead is ours: Elastic’s technique list does not name one for the NVML wrapper, and Disable or Modify Tools fits the falsified monitoring output.
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Defense Impairment → T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools); Impact → T1496.001 (Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking)
Sources: The Hacker News (above), source article; Elastic Security Labs (above), additional source
Ethereum RPC Lookup Followed by Port 8080 Shell
The netns backdoor runs as a systemd service. To find its controller it sends eth_call requests over HTTPS through public Ethereum RPC services to contract 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349 with function selector 0x6ded96e7, decodes an IPv4 address from the response, and opens a plain TCP connection to that address on port 8080; the controller can then send a text command SHELL <host> <port>, and netns forks Bash with a separate outbound connection to that destination, with no authentication on the command loop. The detection logic joins three steps on one host within minutes: a process started by systemd making HTTPS requests to Ethereum RPC providers (or containing the contract address and selector in a JSON-RPC body where TLS is inspected), an outbound TCP 8080 connection from the same process to a bare IP, and a Bash child of that process holding a network socket.
Use EDR network and process telemetry, DNS logs for RPC provider domains from servers, and Zeek or NetFlow for the raw 8080 session. Baseline which servers legitimately talk to blockchain RPC providers (usually none in a GPU or AI cluster) and allowlist by service unit and binary path. Blocking the contract address does nothing at the network layer and blocking public RPC providers breaks legitimate Web3 workloads, so detect on the sequence instead. Query the contract’s current return value from a sandbox to learn the live controller IP, then sweep for it; the same blockchain dead-drop pattern appears in other malware families, so the correlation generalizes.
Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)
ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver), T1095 (Non-Application Layer Protocol); Persistence → T1543.002 (Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service) (mapping per Elastic’s report)
Sources: The Hacker News (above), source article; Elastic Security Labs (above), additional source
Hidden Process Cross-View and Initramfs Integrity
The acpi_thermal_mgr.ko rootkit uses ftrace to hook directory listings so hidden PIDs, files and directories with a configured prefix vanish from getdents results; open and openat return “No such file or directory” for hidden /proc paths, PID queries such as sched_getaffinity and kill return “No such process” except when the caller is the configured manager (sansar), socket entries are filtered, and with hide_module set it removes itself from the kernel module list and sysfs. It persists by being built with DKMS and loaded from the initramfs. The detection logic is cross-view comparison: enumerate processes and sockets with an eBPF or kernel-level sensor and compare them with /proc-based listings and ss output, flag PIDs whose threads consume CPU or hold connections but are missing from /proc listings, check for unexpected ftrace hooks on syscall entry points, and alert when the initramfs image or DKMS tree changes outside a kernel or driver update.
Use EDR or eBPF sensors that observe process creation at the kernel level (they record the miner’s start even if it later hides), host power and CPU accounting, file-integrity monitoring on /boot and /usr/src or /var/lib/dkms, and periodic offline comparison of the initramfs contents with a known-good build. Expect transient mismatches from short-lived processes and tune on persistence across several samples. Rebooting will not clear this rootkit because it reloads from the initramfs, and removing the module from a live system is unreliable once it hides itself; rebuild from known-good media. This approach generalizes to most loadable kernel module rootkits on Linux.
Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)
ATT&CK: Defense Evasion → T1014 (Rootkit); Persistence → T1547.006 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions) (mapping per Elastic’s report)
Sources: The Hacker News (above), source article; Elastic Security Labs (above), additional source
Hash Appendix
SANSAR toolkit (REF3364)
All SHA-256 values come from Elastic Security Labs’ report (additional source); the source article lists no hashes, and OTX AlienVault and VirusTotal were not queried, so MD5 and SHA1 are marked not available. lyrebird is the Tor Project’s legitimate transport helper and kurt and tilki are public miner builds under deceptive names: blocking those hashes could break legitimate Tor or mining software, so detect them by path, name and parentage.
MD5s
(not available) # sansar -> Rust miner orchestrator, /opt/vadi_
(not available) # kurt -> XMRig 6.25.0 (CPU miner, renamed)
(not available) # tilki -> SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 (GPU miner, renamed)
(not available) # lyrebird -> Tor Project transport helper 0.8.1 (legitimate)
(not available) # libnvidia-ml.so.1 -> wrapped NVML library falsifying GPU telemetry
(not available) # acpi_thermal_mgr.ko -> ftrace kernel rootkit
(not available) # netns -> Ethereum-assisted backdoor (systemd service)
SHA1s
(not available) # sansar -> Rust miner orchestrator, /opt/vadi_
(not available) # kurt -> XMRig 6.25.0 (CPU miner, renamed)
(not available) # tilki -> SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 (GPU miner, renamed)
(not available) # lyrebird -> Tor Project transport helper 0.8.1 (legitimate)
(not available) # libnvidia-ml.so.1 -> wrapped NVML library falsifying GPU telemetry
(not available) # acpi_thermal_mgr.ko -> ftrace kernel rootkit
(not available) # netns -> Ethereum-assisted backdoor (systemd service)
SHA256s
00c9ac44291f83c72d54302e99d155a3e26d02225a3e516764d5833a99657c9e # sansar -> Rust miner orchestrator, /opt/vadi_
96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46 # kurt -> XMRig 6.25.0 (CPU miner, renamed)
acc706afc9322a3eae1ef49049749e0a7c9f1a123895ac56dc8a289beb2fb5b7 # tilki -> SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 (GPU miner, renamed)
cc1ad7f14777a098ccc91fd4e8f6143da14418c2b6fdf23b7f8f6b3d1b0b7f1d # lyrebird -> Tor Project transport helper 0.8.1 (legitimate)
675c24728f87f7aa0fa07527027c95c24c246049c65eaef89270ab04ea50a180 # libnvidia-ml.so.1 -> wrapped NVML library falsifying GPU telemetry
6ba1aa275e0e2826e8b48b36473539ca56cbdc41f429e539a45f8532b084d7a4 # acpi_thermal_mgr.ko -> ftrace kernel rootkit
df8ab6fd699e6ae90e63e9696bae8f01342708bafc2ed88af414337e4f237194 # netns -> Ethereum-assisted backdoor (systemd service)
References Appendix
- “SANSAR Linux Cryptomining Malware Uses Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity”, The Hacker News, Nov. 16, 2026, https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware-uses.html (source article)
- “Linux cryptomining malware: Inside the SANSAR toolkit”, Elastic Security Labs (Salim Bitam), Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware (attack chain, ATT&CK mapping, SHA-256 hashes, YARA rules)
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise technique pages linked above, MITRE, https://attack.mitre.org/