SCKit Turns Hacked ScreenConnect PCs Into Traps for MSP Technicians
Microsoft says the ScreenConnect MSP attacks drop SCKit, whose RelayTrap component tries to infect technicians who connect and whose cookie stealer spreads through their console access.
The attackers inside MSPs’ ScreenConnect consoles weren’t just installing a second remote-access client: they were trying to jump from customer PCs back onto the technicians who support them. Microsoft Threat Intelligence says the campaign ConnectWise reported on Nov. 11 drops a toolkit it calls SCKit on managed endpoints. Its RelayTrap component waits for a technician to connect, then tries to push the toolkit onto the technician’s workstation, while another module steals the technician’s console login cookie to spread through every customer that account can reach.
For defenders
The chain: commands sent through the MSP’s own ScreenConnect instance make the endpoint client start cmd.exe, which uses curl.exe to fetch /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi (with a c=Exploited<N> marker) from an attacker ScreenConnect server into C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi, then installs it silently with msiexec /i /qn /norestart (T1219.002 (Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software), T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec)). A batch launcher pulls a PowerShell decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php, which decrypts a bundle keyed to the machine’s MachineGuid into %TEMP%\SCKitBundle (T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)).
Persistence and the trap: scripts go to C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, a RelayTrapLiteAlert value in the machine Run key and a scheduled task start the TrapWatch watcher (T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder), T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task)), and the watcher compiles RelayTrap.exe on the box with the .NET C# compiler. Registry writes add Defender path exclusions for the staged MSIs and CWInstall_…\Installer.ps1. The browser module hunts .ASPXAUTH ScreenConnect cookies in Chrome, Edge and Opera, by database and by reading browser memory, then uploads a payload through the console’s Shared Toolbox (T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie)).
Patch status: ConnectWise says ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 and later, the fix for CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9, on CISA KEV since Sept. 11), block the endpoint-to-technician jump. Cloud console updates don’t update technician clients, so check each one. How the attackers got into the consoles is still under investigation; ConnectWise’s advisory points at the RMM+ extension accepting an empty access key, and the affected extensions should stay disabled. Microsoft publishes KQL hunting queries and 15 SHA-256s; ours are in the Hunt Leads below. Background: https://threatroundup.com/news/screenconnect-msp-rogue-clients-huntress-connectwise/.
ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev (decoder, bundle, scripts)
sc[.]payproofkit[.]com (rogue ScreenConnect panel, installers)
cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com (installer source)
newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org, soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org (ScreenConnect relays)
185[.]99[.]255[.]28 (rogue ScreenConnect server)
155[.]94[.]150[.]39 (associated with the rogue panel)C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi
C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\
%TEMP%\SCKitBundle, %TEMP%\SCKit\trapkit\payload
%TEMP%\k<32 hex>.ps1 (loader output)
HKLM\…\CurrentVersion\Run value RelayTrapLiteAlert
Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10, ed630cc2c873b091What it means for you
If an IT company looks after your computers, it probably uses a remote-support tool like ScreenConnect. Here, attackers who got into those tools tried to use one infected customer PC to infect the technician who logs in to fix it, and from there every other customer. You can’t patch your provider’s tools yourself, but you can ask whether they’re affected and what they’ve done about it.
Do this now
- MSPs: update every technician’s ScreenConnect client to 26.6.5 or later and keep the RMM+ and Labtech Plus extensions disabled.
- Investigate suspect machines through a different tool, not ScreenConnect, and revoke all console web sessions from a clean device.
- Look for C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value and any second ScreenConnect client pointed at an unfamiliar server.
- Small businesses: ask your IT provider directly whether this campaign touched their ScreenConnect.
Source article: SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions
Publisher: Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Published: Nov. 13, 2026
URL: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/
Executive Summary
Microsoft Threat Intelligence describes SCKit, a malware toolkit (which it also calls a worm) deployed in the campaign ConnectWise began reporting on Nov. 11, 2026, in which an unnamed threat actor gained unauthorized access to cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances belonging to managed service providers. No actor name or vendor alias is given; Microsoft confirmed ConnectWise’s reported activity, and ConnectWise is investigating abuse of the RMM+ extension family, whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted an empty access key, as a possible entry route. From the MSP console, the actor tells the installed ScreenConnect client on a customer endpoint to run cmd.exe and curl.exe, downloads a ScreenConnect installer from attacker infrastructure to C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi, and installs it silently so a second client reports to an attacker-controlled instance. A batch launcher then fetches a PowerShell decoder from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, which decrypts a bundle keyed to the device’s MachineGuid with PBKDF2 and AES-256-CBC, extracts it to %TEMP%\SCKitBundle, and stages persistence: scripts under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, a RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value, a scheduled task running the TrapWatch watcher, Microsoft Defender path exclusions, and RelayTrap.exe compiled locally against the client’s own libraries. RelayTrap replaces the endpoint’s ScreenConnect client and tries to push the launcher to any technician who connects with a vulnerable host client (blocked by client 26.6.5, the CVE-2026-84869 fix), while a browser module steals .ASPXAUTH console cookies from Chrome, Edge and Opera by database copy and process-memory scanning and uses them to upload payloads through the Shared Toolbox to every session the technician’s account can reach. The toolkit’s own cleanup mode re-arms it. The objective is broad, durable remote access across MSP customer bases; impact scales with the permissions of each hijacked technician account. Hunt leads, false positive expectations, Microsoft’s published hunting queries and indicators are detailed below.
ATT&CK chain: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Lateral Movement → Command and Control
Hunt Lead Grid
| Hunt Lead Level | Hunt Lead Name | ATT&CK | Risk of False Positives |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (Junior) | SCKit Infrastructure and Rogue ScreenConnect Clients | T1219.002 (Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software), T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) | Low. The domains, IPs and client IDs belong to the attacker’s instance; the lead anchors on those exact values and on ScreenConnect clients enrolled to any instance outside your approved list, not on ScreenConnect itself. |
| 1 (Junior) | RelayTrap Persistence Artifacts | T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder), T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task) | Low. No legitimate software uses the RelayTrap or TrapWatch names; the lead anchors on those strings in Run values, task definitions and the C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap folder. |
| 2 (Pro) | ScreenConnect Client Spawning curl and a Silent Second Install | T1059.003 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell), T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec), T1219.002 (Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software) | Medium. Technicians legitimately run commands and installers through ScreenConnect; the lead anchors on curl fetching a ScreenConnect MSI from a non-approved host into Windows Temp, the c=Exploited marker, and msiexec /qn installing a second client. |
| 2 (Pro) | Defender Exclusions and Generated PowerShell Loaders | T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools), T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell), T1027.004 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery) | Medium. Software deployment tools add exclusions and create temporary scripts; the lead anchors on exclusions naming Windows Temp, ConnectWiseControl_, CWInstall_ or RelayTrap, k<32 hex>.ps1 files, and csc.exe launched by PowerShell under a trapbins folder. |
| 3 (Elite) | Console Cookie Theft and Shared Toolbox Distribution | T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie), T1550.004 (Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie), T1072 (Software Deployment Tools) | High. Password managers and backup tools touch browser profiles, and technicians use the Toolbox daily; the lead needs a join of non-browser access to cookie stores or browser memory on a technician host with console sessions from new sources and Toolbox upload, run and delete bursts. |
SCKit Infrastructure and Rogue ScreenConnect Clients
The first step on each customer endpoint is a second ScreenConnect client that reports to the attacker rather than the MSP. curl.exe downloads /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi from an attacker ScreenConnect server, Microsoft lists 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 as that server and installer source and sc[.]payproofkit[.]com as the unauthorized panel, and the installer configuration names sc[.]payproofkit[.]com and cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com as further MSI sources. The toolkit components (decoder p=4, bundle p=3, SQLite p=5, script p=1, cleanup p=6) all come from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php, with the MachineGuid passed as the m parameter. Microsoft associates newnewnew[.]gotdns[.]org and soxnewwork[.]homedns[.]org with the rogue clients’ relays and 155[.]94[.]150[.]39 with the panel, and lists two unauthorized client identifiers, 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091. The detection logic is a sweep of DNS, proxy and EDR network logs for those domains and IPs, plus an inventory of every installed ScreenConnect client service’s connection parameters (host, relay and client ID in the service’s command line) compared against the MSP’s approved instance.
Use EDR network events, DNS resolver logs, web proxy logs and firewall logs; Microsoft’s query uses a 14-day window, but sweep from at least October 2026 since the console access predates ConnectWise’s Nov. 11 report. Scope every endpoint managed by an affected MSP and every technician workstation. Do not block screenconnect.com or ScreenConnect binaries by hash: the rogue client is the legitimate product, so the evidence is where it connects, not what it is. The gotdns.org and homedns.org parents are shared dynamic DNS zones; block the two subdomains, not the zones. Any hit means the actor had command execution through the MSP console on that device: isolate it through an out-of-band tool, preserve ScreenConnect audit records, and widen scope to the technician accounts that served it.
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (
"ns.mo7sen.dev", "sc.payproofkit.com",
"newnewnew.gotdns.org", "soxnewwork.homedns.org",
"cdn007-digitaldownloads.com")
or RemoteIP in ("185.99.255.28", "155.94.150.39")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ReportId
Published hunting query: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Connections to campaign infrastructure” (source article).
Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)
ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1219.002 (Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software), T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)
Sources: “SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions”, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Nov. 13, 2026, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ (source article)
RelayTrap Persistence Artifacts
After decryption the toolkit stages itself under %TEMP%\SCKit\trapkit\payload and installs into C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. A value named RelayTrapLiteAlert in the machine-wide Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key launches Lite-Alert.ps1 at every user logon, and a scheduled task starts TrapWatch.ps1 with a payload file name, skip lists of client IDs and relay hosts, and -PollSeconds 10. The watcher enumerates ScreenConnect client services every 10 seconds and builds a RelayTrap.exe per client in a trapbins subfolder. ScreenConnect services are also switched to automatic start. The detection logic is to alert on any registry value named RelayTrapLiteAlert or with data containing RelayTrap, any scheduled-task create or update whose definition contains RelayTrap or TrapWatch, any file activity under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap or a trapbins folder, and a Stop-LabTrap.bat or Run-Lateral-Full.bat on disk.
Use EDR registry and scheduled-task telemetry, Windows Security 4698 and 4702, the TaskScheduler Operational log and file creation events; run a one-time fleet sweep of Run keys, tasks and C:\ProgramData. Scope all endpoints managed through an affected ScreenConnect instance. Microsoft warns that the kit’s own cleanup script re-arms the toolkit unless -NoReArm is set, so never use a recovered Stop-LabTrap script to remediate; remove tasks, Run values, files and exclusions with your own response tooling, then confirm nothing was recreated. A hit is a confirmed SCKit install: isolate the device, treat every technician who connected to it after the install date as a possible next victim, and check their client versions.
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "RelayTrapLiteAlert"
or RegistryValueData contains "RelayTrap"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey,
RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType contains "ScheduledTask"
| where AdditionalFields contains "RelayTrap"
or AdditionalFields contains "TrapWatch"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType,
AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId
Published hunting queries: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Registry values referencing RelayTrap” and “RelayTrap scheduled-task events” (source article).
Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)
ATT&CK: Persistence → T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder), T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task), T1543.003 (Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service)
Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (above), source article
ScreenConnect Client Spawning curl and a Silent Second Install
Deployment begins with remote commands sent from the MSP console: the installed ScreenConnect client service starts cmd.exe, which runs curl.exe to download /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with access-session parameters and a c=Exploited<N> marker (c=Exploited9 in Microsoft’s example) and saves it as C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi, after which msiexec.exe installs it with /i /qn /norestart. Next, a PowerShell command decodes a URL-safe Base64 string into a batch file in Windows Temp; the batch sets BATPATH, downloads the decoder from EadF.php?p=4 and runs it with -Mode full, and its hidden-relaunch branch writes a VBScript wrapper and runs it through wscript.exe. A later curl.exe call fetches another installer from sc[.]payproofkit[.]com. The detection logic is process lineage: ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe (or its child cmd.exe) as the parent of curl.exe writing an .msi to C:\Windows\Temp, followed within minutes by msiexec /qn on that file, and any command line containing /EadF.php, SCKit, RelayTrap, Panel-Lateral, ToolboxRelayUploader, .ASPXAUTH or c=Exploited.
Use EDR process telemetry or Sysmon Event ID 1 with full command lines, and ScreenConnect’s own audit log of Run Command events to tie each command to a console user and source IP. Sweep from October 2026. Baseline what your technicians legitimately push through ScreenConnect (agent installers, scripts) and allowlist by the approved download host and signed MSI publisher, not by the curl or msiexec process name. Blocking curl.exe is the wrong control, because Windows ships it and administrators depend on it; the anchors are a ScreenConnect MSI from a non-approved host and a second client service appearing. Escalate any hit and pull the console audit trail for the account that issued the command, because it points straight at a hijacked technician or extension.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/EadF.php"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "SCKit"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "RelayTrap"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "Panel-Lateral"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "ToolboxRelayUploader"
or ProcessCommandLine contains ".ASPXAUTH"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "c=Exploited"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName,
ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId
Published hunting query: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Toolkit command lines and cookie-query activity” (source article).
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Execution → T1059.003 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell), T1059.005 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic); Defense Evasion → T1218.007 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec); Command and Control → T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), T1219.002 (Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software)
Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (above), source article
Defender Exclusions and Generated PowerShell Loaders
SCKit writes Microsoft Defender Antivirus path exclusions for its staged MSI copies and for CWInstall_…\Installer.ps1, so later installs are not scanned. A separate loader requests an encrypted PowerShell stage with p=1, decrypts it with the same MachineGuid-derived key, writes it as %TEMP%\k<32 hex>.ps1 using a random GUID, runs it hidden and deletes it when the child exits. The watcher also invokes the .NET C# compiler to build RelayTrap.exe from RelayTrap.cs and libraries copied from the local ScreenConnect client into a trapbins folder. The detection logic is a registry rule on new values under SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths whose data names Windows Temp, ConnectWiseControl_, CWInstall_ or RelayTrap; a file rule on creation of files matching ^k[0-9a-f]{32}\.ps1$ in a user Temp folder, followed by a hidden powershell.exe running that file and its deletion; and a process rule on csc.exe whose parent is PowerShell and whose output path contains trapbins or RelayTrap.
Use EDR registry, file and process telemetry, Defender operational events 5007 (configuration change) and tamper-protection events. Sweep from October 2026. Scope all Windows endpoints, but expect most noise on servers where deployment tools add exclusions; allowlist those by the signed initiating process and the documented exclusion path, not by the word “Temp”. Turning tamper protection on and confirming that exclusions are protected is the right preventive control, while deleting every exclusion fleet-wide would break legitimate software. A k-hex script plus a fresh exclusion on the same host within a day is high confidence: escalate it and check that host for the RelayTrap artifacts above.
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where RegistryKey contains @"\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RegistryKey,
RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
InitiatingProcessFileName, ReportId
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)^k[0-9a-f]{32}\.ps1$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName,
ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
InitiatingProcessFileName
Published hunting queries: Microsoft Threat Intelligence, “Microsoft Defender Antivirus path-exclusion writes” and “SCKit – Generated PowerShell Loader Artifacts” (source article).
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Defense Evasion → T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools), T1027.004 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery), T1070.004 (Indicator Removal: File Deletion); Execution → T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell)
Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (above), source article
Console Cookie Theft and Shared Toolbox Distribution
Once SCKit reaches a technician workstation it goes after the browser session used to sign in to the ScreenConnect console. It searches Chrome, Edge, Opera and Opera GX profiles for cookies named .ASPXAUTH, copies the cookie databases (falling back to a volume shadow copy if they are locked), queries them with a downloaded sqlite3.exe and decrypts values with the Chromium master key through DPAPI; if that fails, an embedded C# scanner opens the browser’s network-service process (command line containing network.mojom.NetworkService) and reads its memory with OpenProcess, VirtualQueryEx and ReadProcessMemory. The console component then combines the cookie with anti-forgery and access tokens, enumerates sessions, uploads a payload with ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, queues it through the Shared Toolbox and deletes the Toolbox item afterwards. The detection logic joins three signals: on the technician host, a non-browser process (PowerShell, sqlite3.exe or an unsigned binary) reading Chromium Cookies files or opening a browser process with VM_READ access; in ScreenConnect audit logs, the same technician account authenticating from a new IP or user agent; and a burst of Toolbox upload, run-on-many-sessions and delete events from that account within a short window.
This needs EDR file-access and process-access telemetry (Sysmon Event ID 10 for process access), Defender’s “Suspicious DPAPI Activity” style alerts, and ScreenConnect server audit logs forwarded to the SIEM, joined on technician identity and time. Baseline normal Toolbox use per account for two weeks and alert on fan-out above that baseline or on any Toolbox item removed within minutes of upload. Resetting the technician’s password is not enough, Microsoft notes, because stolen sessions survive it; revoke the console web sessions and identity-provider sessions from a clean device and rotate credentials. A confirmed hit means every customer that account could reach is in scope, so start incident response for the whole tenant set rather than the single host. The same join catches any session-cookie theft aimed at a management console.
Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)
ATT&CK: Credential Access → T1539 (Steal Web Session Cookie), T1555.003 (Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers); Lateral Movement → T1550.004 (Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie); Execution, Lateral Movement → T1072 (Software Deployment Tools)
Sources: Microsoft Threat Intelligence (above), source article
Hash Appendix
SCKit installer, bundle and uploader
SHA-256 and SHA-1 values come from the source article; Microsoft published no MD5s, and OTX AlienVault returned no analysis record for the sc.msi SHA-256, so no MD5s were filled. sc.msi is a ScreenConnect client installer configured for the attacker’s instance; hunt on its hash and on where the installed client connects.
MD5s
(not available) # sc.msi -> C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi (rogue ScreenConnect client installer)
(not available) # staged toolkit ZIP -> %TEMP%\SCKitBundle
(not available) # ToolboxRelayUploader.exe -> Shared Toolbox payload uploader
SHA1s
0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2 # sc.msi -> C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi (rogue ScreenConnect client installer)
3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054 # staged toolkit ZIP -> %TEMP%\SCKitBundle
13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3 # ToolboxRelayUploader.exe -> Shared Toolbox payload uploader
SHA256s
61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2 # sc.msi -> C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi (rogue ScreenConnect client installer)
8e6912deed82e80bb6bd66f73509d024b1f78b993515366d8317e69a97cff4f4 # staged toolkit ZIP -> %TEMP%\SCKitBundle
8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af # ToolboxRelayUploader.exe -> Shared Toolbox payload uploader
SCKit scripts and RelayTrap components
SHA-256 values come from the source article; Microsoft published no MD5 or SHA-1 for these files and none were filled from OTX AlienVault or VirusTotal. Microsoft warns that RelayTrap is compiled per host and embedded configuration changes script hashes, so behavior-based leads above matter more than these values.
MD5s / SHA1s
(not available) # all files below
SHA256s
94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11 # Panel-Lateral-free.ps1 -> console distribution script
7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec # Panel-Lateral.ps1 -> console distribution script
b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4d # LabConfig.ps1 -> helper
3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4 # RelayTrap.cs -> RelayTrap source, compiled on host
d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a # TrapWatch.ps1 -> watcher started by scheduled task
4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b # trapkit\install.ps1 -> persistence installer
cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956 # Lite-Alert.ps1 -> RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value
81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781 # Stage0Loader.ps1 -> encrypted PowerShell loader
43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95 # Run-Lateral-Full.bat -> batch launcher
50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61 # runnew.cmd -> launcher
5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0 # Stop-LabTrap.bat -> cleanup-mode launcher (re-arms kit)
454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8a # TRAP-PROOF.bat -> proof artifact
References Appendix
- “SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions”, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Nov. 13, 2026, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ (source article; attack chain, hunting queries, indicators)
- ConnectWise security investigation and partner guidance (RMM+ extension advisory), ConnectWise, Nov. 2026, https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories (cited by the source article)
- ScreenConnect security bulletin, ConnectWise, Sept. 8, 2026, https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin (CVE-2026-84869 fix, client 26.6.5; cited by the source article)
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise technique pages linked above, MITRE, https://attack.mitre.org/
CVE at a glance
- CVSS
- 9.9 Critical (v3.1)
- EPSS
- 1.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (higher than 67.9% of CVEs)
- Exploited in the wild
- Yes, on CISA’s KEV list since Sep 11, 2026
- Public exploit
- None reported in public exploit databases
Data from NVD, FIRST EPSS and CISA KEV, refreshed automatically. We report whether public exploit code exists but never link to it: fake proof-of-concepts that infect researchers are common.