High 5 Hunt LeadsIOCsUAT-12643Overlord RATGood GameCisco Talos

This RAT Survives ‘Reset This PC’ and Hides Its C2 on Solana

Cisco Talos says UAT-12643, a financially motivated group it links to North Korea with low confidence, targets crypto, gaming and VoIP users with Overlord RAT, which reads its C2 from Solana memos and persists through a Windows reset, plus the Good Game stealer and a clipboard hijacker.

A malware crew left its staging server’s front door open, and Cisco Talos walked in. Talos says the financially motivated group it tracks as UAT-12643 is going after crypto holders, gamers and VoIP softphone users with a Go remote-access trojan called Overlord, an off-the-shelf Python stealer and a crypto clipboard swapper. The RAT reads its command server’s address from Solana blockchain memos, and it plants a copy of itself in the Windows recovery partition so it comes back after a “Reset this PC”. Talos links the group to North Korea only with low confidence, based on overlapping tradecraft.

For defenders

Way in: Talos found three kinds of lure but not how they were delivered: shortcut files dressed as PDFs that download the payload with Defender’s own MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile or certutil -urlcache -f (saved as RuntimeBroker.exe), an HTA run by mshta.exe that writes %TEMP%\s.exe, and an MSBuild project, dl.xml, that compiles C# in memory and downloads with a fake “Microsoft BITS/7.8” User-Agent. That’s T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), T1218.005 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta) and T1127.001 (Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild). Lures included a trojanized Viber installer, “microsip” files and a fake financial statement.

Overlord RAT: 35 commands (keylogging, webcam, mic, screen, files, reverse SOCKS, in-memory plugins). It marks itself a critical process, so killing it blue-screens the machine. Persistence is a randomly named Run key value pointing into the user’s AppData “Network” folder, plus a batch file and random 20-character payload in %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ registered in ResetConfig.xml. C2 addresses are AES-encrypted 43-character memos on an attacker’s Solana wallet, read through getSignatures/getTransaction RPC calls, T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver).

Good Game stealer and clipper: the stealer (public code, not written by the actor) hits 23 browsers, Discord and Roblox tokens, 21 wallets and game launchers, persists as Run value Zoipers plus a Startup-folder copy, briefly sets DisableTaskMgr=1, zips loot as SK_<8 chars>.zip and exfiltrates via gofile and a Discord webhook. The C++ clipper uses mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc and persists as %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe with Run value MsgEdgeUpdate, T1115 (Clipboard Data).

Network
41.216.188[.]11 (staging server; ports 8000 file drop, 5173 Overlord WebSocket C2, 5656 and 5959 stealer C2)

Host
Mutex: UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc
Run value: MsgEdgeUpdate -> %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe (hidden, system)
Run value: Zoipers
%TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ResetConfig.xml modified, new .bat + 20-char payload
%TEMP%\s.exe ; %TEMP%\SK_*.zip ; %TEMP%\url_opened_*.flag

Talos published 11 SHA256 hashes in its IOC repository, plus ClamAV signatures and Snort SIDs 1:67490 and 1:67491 (Snort 3: 7:74, 7:75); the hashes are in the Hunt Lead report below.

What it means for you

This campaign is after people’s crypto wallets, game accounts and saved passwords. The tricks are old ones: a “PDF” that’s really a shortcut, a fake Viber installer. If a file you didn’t ask for claims to be an invoice or a statement, don’t open it. If you hold crypto, always double-check the address you paste before sending, because this malware swaps it for the attacker’s.

Do this now

  1. Turn on “show file extensions” in Windows so a .pdf.lnk shortcut can’t pass as a PDF.
  2. Install apps like Viber only from the official site or app store.
  3. Compare the first and last characters of every crypto address after pasting, before you hit send.
  4. Admins: alert on MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile, certutil -urlcache and msbuild.exe running outside build servers.

Source article: UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing
Publisher: Cisco Talos (author: Chetan Raghuprasad)
Published: Nov. 18, 2026
URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/

Executive Summary

UAT-12643 is a financially motivated cluster that Cisco Talos tracks under that designation alone and assesses, with low confidence, to be North Korea-aligned because of tradecraft overlaps: its Overlord RAT was previously used by the suspected North Korean cluster UNK_DeadDrop (reported by Proofpoint in June 2026), and its Solana-memo C2 technique was earlier reported in Lazarus Group activity, though Talos notes both are also used by other actors. The campaign appears to target cryptocurrency holders, gaming-platform users, VoIP softphone operators and finance staff, with document-harvesting keywords in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese pointing to European victims. Talos reconstructed the toolset from the actor’s exposed staging server at 41.216.188[.]11. The chain starts with a lure whose delivery Talos did not observe: a shortcut disguised as a PDF that downloads a payload through MpCmdRun.exe or certutil, an HTA run by mshta.exe, or an MSBuild project that compiles and runs a C# downloader in memory. The payloads are Overlord RAT (Go, 35 commands, critical-process protection, Run-key persistence plus Windows Recovery Environment reset persistence, C2 discovery through encrypted Solana transaction memos), the public Good Game Python stealer (browsers, Discord and Roblox tokens, wallets, game launchers, keyword-matched documents, exfiltration through gofile and a Discord webhook) and a C++ clipboard hijacker that swaps copied cryptocurrency addresses. The objective is theft of credentials, sessions and cryptocurrency. Hunt leads, false positive expectations, published detection references and indicators are detailed below.

ATT&CK chain: Execution → Persistence → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Collection → Command and Control → Exfiltration

Hunt Lead Grid

Hunt Lead Level Hunt Lead Name ATT&CK Risk of False Positives
1 (Junior) UAT-12643 Infrastructure and Hash Sweep T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) Low. The staging IP and the published hashes belong to the actor’s toolset; the only noise is shared hosting on the same address, so the sweep anchors on the specific ports and hashes Talos lists.
1 (Junior) Clipper and Stealer Persistence Artifacts T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder) Low. Microsoft’s real Edge updater does not live in the root of %APPDATA% or register a Run value named MsgEdgeUpdate, and the mutex and Zoipers value are campaign-specific; anchoring on exact names and paths keeps hits rare.
2 (Pro) Signed Windows Binaries Fetching Payloads T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer), T1127.001 (Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild), T1218.005 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta) Medium. Admin scripts occasionally use certutil to fetch files and build servers run MSBuild constantly; the rule anchors on a shortcut, Explorer or Office parent, user-writable output paths and non-build hosts.
2 (Pro) Windows Recovery OEM Reset Script Tampering Not mapped (no ATT&CK technique cleanly covers WinRE reset-script persistence) Low. OEM imaging tools write to Recovery\OEM during provisioning, but almost never on a live user machine; anchoring on writes by a non-installer user-context process removes that.
3 (Elite) Solana RPC Lookups Followed by New C2 T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver) Medium. Crypto wallets and browser extensions legitimately call Solana RPC endpoints; the correlation anchors on a non-wallet, unsigned or user-path process making the call and then opening a WebSocket to a first-seen address.

UAT-12643 Infrastructure and Hash Sweep

Talos found the actor’s toolset on 41.216.188[.]11, where a Flask file-delivery service on port 8000 served Payload.exe, MyApp2.exe and HTA files, port 5173 handled Overlord RAT WebSocket C2 (Ovl.exe, Client.exe), and ports 5656 and 5959 took Python stealer traffic (Ova.exe, MyApp2.exe, microsip-config.exe, microsip-config1.exe). Talos also published 11 SHA256 hashes covering Overlord, three Good Game builds, the clipper, the LNK generator script, dl.xml, three shortcut lures and payload.hta. The detection is a retrospective search for any connection to that IP (any port, with the four listed ports as the strongest signal) and any file matching the hashes in the appendix.

Search firewall, proxy and NetFlow logs, and EDR network and file-hash telemetry, back at least 90 days, since Talos does not date the campaign’s start and Overlord’s reset persistence can outlive a cleanup. Scope it to all endpoints, with priority on finance, call-center and help-desk machines that match the lure themes. Blocking the IP at the perimeter is fine, but don’t treat a clean sweep as proof of safety: the RAT finds its C2 through the blockchain, so a new address needs no new binary. Any hit on the hashes or ports 5173, 5656 or 5959 should go straight to incident response; a lone port-8000 download is still a likely infection.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer) (our mapping; the source lists no ATT&CK IDs)

Sources: “UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing”, Cisco Talos, Nov. 18, 2026, https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/ (source article); Cisco Talos IOC repository, https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/tree/main/2026/11 (linked from the source article)

Clipper and Stealer Persistence Artifacts

The clipboard hijacker creates mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc, copies itself to %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe with hidden and system attributes, and adds an HKCU Run value named MsgEdgeUpdate, posing as an Edge updater. The Good Game stealer writes its own path under HKCU Run value Zoipers, drops a copy in the user’s Startup folder, leaves url_opened_<md5>.flag and sometimes a file named skipped in %TEMP%, builds its loot archive as %TEMP%\SK_<8 random characters>.zip, and temporarily sets HKLM ...\Policies\System\DisableTaskMgr to 1. The detection is an artifact sweep for those exact names, plus a standing rule on any process writing the DisableTaskMgr value.

Use EDR registry and file telemetry (Sysmon Event IDs 12/13 for registry, 11 for file creation) and a live-response query of Run keys and Startup folders across the fleet. Sweep back 90 days for the file artifacts; the Run values can be checked as current state. Scope is all Windows endpoints. Don’t hash-block MsgEdgeUpdate.exe alone, because the clipper’s configuration is compiled in and rebuilt samples will differ; detect the path and value name. A DisableTaskMgr change by anything other than Group Policy processing is worth escalating on its own, and it generalizes well beyond this stealer.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Persistence → T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder); Defense Evasion → T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location), T1112 (Modify Registry); Collection → T1115 (Clipboard Data) (our mapping)

Sources: Cisco Talos, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Signed Windows Binaries Fetching Payloads

Each lure hands the download to a trusted Windows binary. One shortcut, disguised with a PDF icon, runs MpCmdRun.exe with -DownloadFile and saves the payload as RuntimeBroker.exe with a minimized window; another, named like payment-invoice.pdf.lnk with an Edge PDF icon, uses certutil -urlcache -f (both built on host win-8oa3ccqae4d). The HTA runs under mshta.exe and uses MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP and ADODB.Stream to write %TEMP%\s.exe and run it hidden. The MSBuild project dl.xml uses an inline CodeTaskFactory C# task and downloads with a spoofed “Microsoft BITS/7.8” User-Agent. The detection logic is process-creation rules for MpCmdRun.exe with -DownloadFile, certutil.exe with -urlcache and a URL, mshta.exe launching from a user-writable path or spawning a child, and msbuild.exe run with a project file from a user folder, each raised in severity when the parent is explorer.exe (a double-clicked shortcut) and when the output lands in %TEMP% or %APPDATA%.

Use EDR or Sysmon Event ID 1 with full command lines, plus proxy logs for the BITS-style User-Agent coming from a process that isn’t svchost.exe hosting the BITS service. Run it as a standing rule and sweep 90 days. Exclude build servers and developer machines from the MSBuild rule or baseline them separately, and allowlist known admin scripts that use certutil by script path and signer. Blocking these binaries outright is the wrong control: MpCmdRun is part of Defender and certutil and MSBuild have legitimate uses. A hit on an ordinary user workstation with an Explorer parent is high confidence and should be escalated; the pattern applies to most commodity loaders, not just this group.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer); Defense Evasion → T1127.001 (Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild), T1218.005 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta); Execution → T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File) (our mapping)

Sources: Cisco Talos, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Windows Recovery OEM Reset Script Tampering

With admin rights, Overlord removes any earlier copy, creates %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\, writes itself there under a random 20-character name, wraps a cmd.exe /c start %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\<name> command in a .bat file, backs up the existing reset configuration and then creates or patches ResetConfig.xml to register the batch file. When anyone runs “Reset this PC”, Windows Recovery Environment runs the RAT before restoring the OS, so the implant survives a reset. The detection logic is any file creation or modification under C:\Recovery\OEM\ (including ResetConfig.xml and new .bat or .exe files) by a process that isn’t a known imaging or OEM provisioning tool.

Use EDR file telemetry or Sysmon Event ID 11 with a rule covering the Recovery\OEM path, and add a one-off fleet query listing the folder’s contents and the ResetConfig.xml modification time. Scope is every Windows endpoint; on most user machines the folder should be empty or untouched since imaging. Don’t rely on “Reset this PC” as remediation for any machine infected with Overlord until this folder is checked and cleaned, or the reset itself will reinstall the RAT. Any non-provisioning write here should be treated as a confirmed compromise and escalated. The lead generalizes to any malware that abuses WinRE reset scripts.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Persistence → not mapped (insufficient fit: no current technique specifically covers Windows Recovery Environment reset scripts; T1542 (Pre-OS Boot) is the nearest parent but describes firmware and bootloader abuse)

Sources: Cisco Talos, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Solana RPC Lookups Followed by New C2

Overlord does not hardcode its C2. It asks a Solana RPC node for the transaction signatures of an actor-controlled wallet (getSignatures, newest first), pulls each transaction with getTransaction and jsonParsed encoding, and takes the first instruction whose data is exactly 43 characters, an AES-encrypted Base58 WebSocket URL; it then connects to that WebSocket (port 5173 on the staging server in this campaign). The operator can move C2 by posting one memo, with no change to deployed binaries. The detection logic is a correlation: a process that is not a known wallet, browser or wallet extension makes HTTPS requests to Solana JSON-RPC endpoints, and within minutes the same process opens a WebSocket or long-lived connection to an IP or domain first seen in the environment.

Join EDR network events (process image, signer, path) with proxy or DNS logs that show Solana RPC hostnames, keyed on host and process. Build a baseline of which signed applications legitimately talk to Solana RPC, and allowlist by signer and install path rather than process name, since the RAT can be renamed. Blocking Solana RPC hosts wholesale is a poor control where staff use wallets and only shifts the actor to another public RPC provider. Sweep back 90 days; a correlated hit from an unsigned binary in a user profile path is high confidence and should go to incident response, and the method also catches the Node.js-based Solana dead drops reported in Lazarus activity.

Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver) (our mapping)

Sources: Cisco Talos, Nov. 18, 2026 (source article)

Hash Appendix

UAT-12643 toolset (Overlord RAT, Good Game stealer, clipboard hijacker, lures)

SHA256 values come from the Cisco Talos IOC file linked from the source article. Talos published no MD5 or SHA1 values, and none were looked up in OTX or VirusTotal for this report.

MD5s

(not available)  # Overlord RAT
(not available)  # Good Game stealer (build 1)
(not available)  # Good Game stealer Python script
(not available)  # Good Game stealer (build 2)
(not available)  # Clipboard hijacker
(not available)  # LNK generator script
(not available)  # dl.xml -> MSBuild inline-task downloader
(not available)  # document.lnk -> shortcut lure
(not available)  # payload.hta -> HTA dropper
(not available)  # payment-invoice.pdf.lnk -> shortcut lure
(not available)  # Viber.lnk -> shortcut lure

SHA1s

(not available)  # Overlord RAT
(not available)  # Good Game stealer (build 1)
(not available)  # Good Game stealer Python script
(not available)  # Good Game stealer (build 2)
(not available)  # Clipboard hijacker
(not available)  # LNK generator script
(not available)  # dl.xml -> MSBuild inline-task downloader
(not available)  # document.lnk -> shortcut lure
(not available)  # payload.hta -> HTA dropper
(not available)  # payment-invoice.pdf.lnk -> shortcut lure
(not available)  # Viber.lnk -> shortcut lure

SHA256s

b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c  # Overlord RAT
16622bb8df60403217ccf8e326e2e9e718e01c85d7b52fe5c5e1cf44d62d25c8  # Good Game stealer (build 1)
b0b636f5c7e40af94aacf9ebd9a696dac57debcd628127414248908562380d33  # Good Game stealer Python script
5a52d6773840fd5ab45d781d572d9fbd6a8dacb08dcda65036ce8b28548a5224  # Good Game stealer (build 2)
f1e5174084bfded283b9dcf081615478e6941d12b652793197556beb72cc7588  # Clipboard hijacker
f7951b11be06d59a3e8fdd9bde4f19869978de8385c9107129c635b2cdba5082  # LNK generator script
19ca4e0e8e7dd62d130afbfed49646f1566dce2633cf937b848d990da3e3e9a2  # dl.xml -> MSBuild inline-task downloader
1b268a08e83839f6e89acf0987657776398de2ba5a323b04b1dd3925ce3a5b45  # document.lnk -> shortcut lure
c8f9ce4b58acec3ce5640041cbc6d4802e30b2dded4a88766ee2de2cefde45f7  # payload.hta -> HTA dropper
eb5730784e7d63e1fe38a0bc28be8f2210666662e9a660efcc3282f0489ef870  # payment-invoice.pdf.lnk -> shortcut lure
68786345f67152eb0d52bb198b5904924cfbdbf50c078432e5329e5d02fc6659  # Viber.lnk -> shortcut lure

References Appendix

  • “UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing”, Cisco Talos (Chetan Raghuprasad), Nov. 18, 2026, https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/
  • Cisco Talos IOC repository, UAT-12643 indicators, https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/blob/main/2026/11/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing.txt

More from the Roundup