Gamaredon Group (Aqua Blizzard)
FSB-linked espionage crew that phishes Ukrainian government and military targets nonstop, now exploiting a WinRAR flaw and handing access to Turla.
- Active
- 2013 to June 2026
- Origin
- Russia
- Type
- State-sponsored
- Affiliates
- FSB 18th Center of Information Security (per SSU), UAC-0010 (Armageddon), Turla (collaboration reported by ESET), InvisiMole (collaboration reported by ESET)
- Regions targeted
- Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland, Europe, NATO member states
- MITRE ATT&CK
- G0047
What each vendor calls it
- Microsoft
- ACTINIUMAqua BlizzardDEV-0157
- CrowdStrike
- Primitive Bear
- Google / Mandiant
- UNC530
- Palo Alto Unit 42
- Gamaredon GroupTrident Ursa
- Sophos / Secureworks
- IRON TILDEN
- Symantec
- ArmageddonShuckworm
Also known as Blue OtsoBlueAlphaGamaredonNastyShrewSectorC08UAC-0010 CERT-UAWinterflounder
Profile
Gamaredon is the busiest Russian espionage crew in Ukraine, and probably the least subtle. MITRE ATT&CK describes it as a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has gone after Ukrainian military, law enforcement, judiciary and non-governmental organizations since at least 2013, and notes that the name comes from a misspelling of “Armageddon” found in its early campaigns. In November 2021 the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) named five officers it said ran the operation: Crimean FSB officers working under the FSB’s 18th Center of Information Security, whom it charged with treason and espionage on the strength of intercepted communications. The SSU put the tally at more than 5,000 attacks on over 1,500 Ukrainian government, public and private systems since 2014. CERT-UA tracks the group as UAC-0010 (Armageddon), and ESET says it operates out of occupied Crimea.
The mission is plain intelligence collection in support of Russia’s war. Targets are overwhelmingly Ukrainian government, military, security service and law enforcement bodies, plus the people around them. Ukraine’s National Cybersecurity Coordination Center reported in August 2023 that Gamaredon built out infrastructure ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and stepped up attempts to steal military information, using stolen real documents from compromised organizations as lures. Symantec, which calls the group Shuckworm, found it hunting for military files and HR records in 2023, and in 2025 caught it on the network of a Western country’s military mission in Ukraine, apparently via an infected removable drive.
The tradecraft is crude by design and relentless in practice. Almost every intrusion starts with spearphishing, T1566.001 (Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment): Word documents with remote templates in the early years, T1221 (Template Injection), then archives, LNK shortcuts and HTA files, and more recently XHTML attachments that assemble the payload in the browser, T1027.006 (Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling). The malware is mostly VBScript and PowerShell, churned out in endless slightly different variants. ESET counted more than a thousand Ukrainian machines attacked between November 2022 and the end of 2023 and calls the group noisy and reckless but persistent; Symantec says the tools are simple but the frequency and persistence of attacks make it a key regional threat. Once inside, it spreads to USB sticks and network shares, T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media), which is one way it reaches machines its emails never touch.
Its infrastructure habits are as distinctive as its malware. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (which uses the names Gamaredon and Trident Ursa) mapped more than 700 domains in one early-2022 snapshot, and later documented fast-flux DNS, T1568.001 (Dynamic Resolution: Fast Flux DNS), and Telegram channel posts used to hand out fresh command-and-control addresses, T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver). That dead-drop habit has only grown: ESET, Sekoia and Symantec describe Telegram, Telegraph, Dropbox, GoFile, Write.as, Rentry and Mastodon all used to publish C2 details, with real servers hidden behind Cloudflare tunnels and, from May 2025, Cloudflare Workers. MITRE lists Cloudflare’s NastyShrew as one of the group’s names; Cloudflare’s 2026 threat report describes NastyShrew as a Russia-based actor that uses paste sites as dead drops.
The biggest change of the past year is exploitation. Gamaredon historically relied on users clicking things, but from September 26, 2025, according to ESET, every campaign it observed used rigged RAR archives exploiting the WinRAR path traversal flaw CVE-2025-8088, T1203 (Exploitation for Client Execution), to drop a downloader silently into the Startup folder. Trend Micro, which tracks the group as Earth Dahu, says it was still producing new exploit archives in April 2026, often sent from compromised Ukrainian government mailboxes dressed up as court summonses and writs. Sekoia’s June 2026 reconstruction of a January 2026 intrusion shows the resulting chain: an HTA loader, a USB worm that hides code in NTFS alternate data streams, and a PowerShell stealer that keeps 71 encrypted modules in the registry and ships files to S3-compatible storage.
Two findings stand out. First, in September 2025 ESET reported, with high confidence, that Gamaredon was working with Turla, another FSB-linked group: Gamaredon tools restarted and installed Turla‘s Kazuar backdoor on a handful of Ukrainian machines in February, April and June 2025. ESET’s reading is that Gamaredon provides broad access and Turla picks the most valuable targets. ESET also believes Gamaredon collaborates with InvisiMole, and Sekoia sees InvisiMole-style tradecraft in the newest stealer. Second, in late 2025 ClearSky flagged a VBScript wiper it dubbed GamaWiper and attributed it to Gamaredon with moderate confidence. Treat that one carefully: Sekoia says the wiper appears aimed at researchers’ sandboxes and, per its partner, has never been seen on real victims, and ESET’s review of 2025 does not describe any destructive operation.
The targeting has occasionally strayed beyond Ukraine. CERT-UA reported an April 2022 phishing wave sent to a Latvian government body, ESET saw attempts against Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in 2022 and 2023, and Unit 42 caught a failed attempt on a petroleum refiner in a NATO country in August 2022. ESET says that by 2024 the group had dropped those efforts and was hitting only Ukrainian government institutions, a focus that held through 2025. The working pattern fits a state office: ESET notes tool updates cluster before Russian and Crimean holidays, with nothing during them.
Names vary by vendor: Microsoft calls it Aqua Blizzard (formerly ACTINIUM and DEV-0157), CrowdStrike Primitive Bear, Secureworks IRON TILDEN and Mandiant UNC530; other names include BlueAlpha and Winterflounder (full list above).
Events
| Date | Target | Narrative | Source | Our coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-01 | Ukrainian government entities | Sekoia rebuilds an intrusion from more than 70 artifacts: a CVE-2025-8088 archive drops the GammaPhish HTA, GammaLoad loaders pull C2 from dead drops, the GammaWorm VBScript worm hides in NTFS alternate data streams, T1564.004 (Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes), and spreads via decoy LNKs, and the GammaSteel stealer exfiltrates to S3-compatible storage, T1567.002 (Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage). Sekoia mapped 55 new servers set up between Jan. 16 and 28. | Sekoia, Sekoia | |
| 2025-12 to 2026-04 | Ukrainian government and military bodies | Trend Micro sees Earth Dahu sending RAR archives that exploit CVE-2025-8088 from compromised Ukrainian government mailboxes, T1586.002 (Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts), posing as court summonses, writs of execution and property seizure orders. The HTA lands in the Startup folder and pulls VBScript through dynamic DNS and Cloudflare Workers. | Trend Micro | |
| 2025-11 | Ukrainian organizations (as claimed) | ClearSky flags a VBScript wiper, GamaWiper, delivered through the WinRAR chain and attributed to Gamaredon with moderate confidence. Sekoia says the wiper appears aimed at researchers’ sandboxes and, according to its partner, has never been seen on real victims. | Sekoia | |
| 2025-09-26 | Ukrainian government and military institutions | ESET sees Gamaredon distribute RAR archives exploiting CVE-2025-8088 for the first time, placing an HTA downloader in the user’s Startup folder, T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder). Every later 2025 campaign it observed used the exploit; ESET counted 35 campaigns that year. | ESET | |
| 2025-02 to 2025-06 | A handful of high-value Ukrainian machines | Gamaredon’s PteroGraphin and PteroOdd restart Turla’s Kazuar v3 (February), PteroOdd installs Kazuar v2 (April) and PteroPaste deploys it on two more machines (June). ESET has high confidence the two FSB-linked groups are cooperating, with Gamaredon most likely handing Turla access. | ESET | |
| 2025-02 to 2025-03 | A Western country’s military mission based in Ukraine | Infection apparently starts from an LNK on an external drive. Obfuscated VBScript and PowerShell loaders lead to an updated PowerShell GammaSteel stealer, with cURL over Tor as a fallback exfiltration route and malicious LNKs planted on removable and network drives. | Symantec | |
| 2024-11 to 2025-03 | Users in Ukraine | Talos (medium confidence) sees ZIP-packed LNK files with Russian-language names about troop movements fetch a second-stage ZIP that side-loads the Remcos backdoor, T1574.001 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL). | Cisco Talos | |
| 2024 | Ukrainian government institutions only | ESET records larger, more frequent phishing waves, six new tools including the Dropbox-exfiltrating PteroBox, a move from ngrok back to Cloudflare tunnels, and in July a payload whose only job was to open a pro-Russian Telegram channel aimed at the Odesa region. Attempts against other NATO countries stop. | ESET | |
| 2023 (mid-year) | Ukrainian military and government networks | Ukraine’s NCSCC reports Gamaredon prepared infrastructure before the counteroffensive and sharply increased attacks to steal military information, using stolen real documents as lures and Telegram and Telegraph for covert C2. | Ukraine NCSCC | |
| 2023-02 to 2023-05 | Ukrainian military, security service, research and government organizations | Phishing with .docx, .rar, .sfx, .lnk and .hta attachments delivers Pterodo and the Giddome infostealer; a PowerShell script copies the backdoor to USB drives under names like do_not_delete.rtf.lnk. Some access lasted three months, and HR departments were of interest. | Symantec | |
| 2023-08 | A Ukrainian military system and a government webmail service | ESET discovers PteroBleed, a stealer built to take data tied to a Ukrainian military system and a webmail service used by a government institution. | ESET | |
| 2022-04 and 2023-02 | Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland | ESET sees attempted attacks on organizations in four NATO countries; no successful breaches were observed. | ESET | |
| 2022-08-30 | Large petroleum refining company in a NATO member state | Unit 42 finds an unsuccessful attempt to compromise the refiner while reviewing Trident Ursa infrastructure. | Unit 42 | |
| 2022-03 to 2022-04 | Latvian government body; Ukrainian state agencies | CERT-UA reports English-language “military humanitarian assistance” lures with links to RAR archives of malicious LNKs sent to a Latvian state body, which it reads as UAC-0010 targeting EU governments. A separate wave against Ukrainian agencies used a “Russian war criminals” HTML lure leading to the GammaLoad.PS1 loader. | CERT-UA, CERT-UA | |
| 2022-02-24 | Ukrainian and other security researchers | On the day of the invasion a person tied to the group, using the name “Anton,” threatens researchers who track it, and doxxes one days later. | Unit 42 | |
| 2022-01-19 | Western government entity operating in Ukraine | Instead of email, the attackers upload a malicious downloader disguised as a résumé through a Ukrainian job search site, a targeted delivery Unit 42 found while mapping more than 700 Gamaredon domains. | Unit 42 | |
| 2021-11-04 | Not applicable (attribution) | The SSU names five Crimean FSB officers working under the FSB’s 18th Center of Information Security as members of the group and charges them with treason and espionage. | BleepingComputer | |
| 2021-10 | Ukrainian emergency response, territorial security and aid-coordination bodies; Ukrainian government agencies | Microsoft sees ACTINIUM targeting organizations critical to emergency response and humanitarian aid with remote-template macro documents and tracking web bugs. Proofpoint separately catches the group using RTF template injection with lures impersonating Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. | Microsoft, Proofpoint | |
| 2021-07 to 2021-08 | Ukrainian organization | Symantec case study: a malicious Word document leads to repeated Pterodo variants with scheduled-task persistence, T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task), and finally UltraVNC for hands-on remote control. | Symantec | |
| 2020 (spring) | Ukrainian institutions and their contacts | ESET finds an Outlook VBA module that mails malicious documents from victims’ own accounts to their contacts, T1534 (Internal Spearphishing), and tools that inject macros or remote templates into documents already on the machine, T1080 (Taint Shared Content). | ESET | |
| 2020-04 | Organizations in Europe and elsewhere | Trend Micro reports emails with a “Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)” subject whose documents load a remote macro template that sets a RunOnce key and fetches an XOR-encrypted payload. | Trend Micro | |
| 2014 to 2016 | Ukrainian government, military and national security staff | Unit 42 traces the move from password-protected self-extracting archives, wget and legitimate remote tools such as Remote Manipulator System and UltraVNC (2014) to custom downloaders (2015) and the Pteranodon backdoor (2016). | Unit 42 | |
| 2013 | Ukrainian organizations | Earliest activity MITRE and Unit 42 attribute to the group. | MITRE ATT&CK |
Target vectors risk profile
| Government | Defense | Espionage | Diplomatic | Dissidents/NGOs | Critical infrastructure | Energy | Education/research | Cloud/identity | Edge devices/VPNs | Finance | Disruption/wiper | Ransomware/extortion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | High | High | Medium | Medium | Medium | Medium | Low | Low | N/A | N/A | Low | N/A |
Malware and tools
| Name | What it does | Public detection | Hunt Leads | Reports |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GammaPhish, GammaLoad, GammaWorm, GammaSteel | Sekoia’s (and CERT-UA’s) names for the 2026 chain: HTA initial loader, cascading VBScript loaders with dead-drop failover, a USB and network-drive worm hiding in NTFS streams, and a PowerShell stealer stored DPAPI-encrypted in the registry | Hunting indicators in Sekoia’s reports | Sekoia, Sekoia, Sekoia, Symantec | |
| PteroSand, PteroDee, PteroCache, PteroDum, PteroOdd, PteroEffigy, PteroPaste | ESET’s names for the 2025 VBScript downloader and six new PowerShell downloaders; PteroOdd and PteroPaste also delivered Turla’s Kazuar | Indicators in ESET’s malware-ioc repository | ESET, ESET | |
| PteroLNK, PteroPSDoor, PteroBox, PteroGraphin, PteroTickle | USB and network-drive weaponizer, PowerShell backdoor with USB monitoring, Dropbox file stealer, Telegraph-based payload delivery and a lateral-movement tool | Indicators in ESET’s malware-ioc repository | ESET | |
| Pterodo (Pteranodon) | The group’s long-running custom backdoor family, repeatedly redeveloped; runs commands, downloads files and takes screenshots | Community YARA rule in signature-base (older compiled samples) | Symantec, Unit 42 | |
| QuietSieve, PowerPunch, DinoTrain, DesertDown, DilongTrash, ObfuBerry, ObfuMerry | Microsoft’s names for ACTINIUM’s 2021 stealers, droppers and downloaders | Indicators in Microsoft’s report | Microsoft | |
| Giddome | Infostealer deployed alongside Pterodo in 2023 | Indicators in Symantec’s report | Symantec | |
| Remcos | Commercial remote access tool, side-loaded via a legitimate executable in a 2024 to 2025 campaign | Snort SIDs in Talos’s report; indicators in the Talos IOC repository | Cisco Talos | |
| UltraVNC, Remote Manipulator System | Legitimate remote administration tools abused for hands-on access, T1219 (Remote Access Tools) | None published | Symantec | |
| GamaWiper (GammaWipe) | VBScript wiper ClearSky attributes to the group with moderate confidence; Sekoia says it appears aimed at analysts’ sandboxes | None published | Sekoia |
Reports
Vulnerabilities exploited
| Vulnerability | CVSS | Severity | Publisher | Platform | CISA KEV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-8088 | 8.8 | High | RARLAB | WinRAR for Windows (before 7.13) | Yes |
If you’re in their sights
Do this now
- Update WinRAR to 7.13 or later on every machine, and find the copies nobody manages: WinRAR doesn’t update itself, and Gamaredon has used CVE-2025-8088 in every campaign ESET saw since September 2025. Alert on any HTA, VBS or LNK file written into a user’s Startup folder.
- Block or tightly control mshta.exe and wscript.exe for ordinary users, and quarantine HTA, XHTML, LNK and archive attachments at the mail gateway. Nearly every Gamaredon chain runs through those script hosts.
- Treat USB sticks and shared drives as an infection path. Disable autorun, watch for new LNK files appearing on removable and network drives, and hunt for scripts hidden in NTFS alternate data streams and new scheduled tasks or Run keys that launch scripts.
- Watch outbound traffic from workstations to trycloudflare.com tunnels, workers.dev, Telegram, Telegraph, Rentry, Write.as and S3-compatible storage endpoints. Office staff rarely need these, and Gamaredon uses them for both C2 and exfiltration.
- Don’t trust a message because it comes from a real government mailbox. Gamaredon sends lures from compromised Ukrainian government accounts, so verify unexpected court papers or official requests by another channel before opening attachments.
Compiled from the Security Service of Ukraine (via BleepingComputer), CERT-UA, Ukraine’s NCSCC, ESET, Symantec, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Microsoft, Sekoia, Trend Micro, Cisco Talos, Proofpoint and MITRE ATT&CK, plus ThreatRoundup reporting. Last reviewed November 1, 2026.
ATT&CK techniques (70)
Techniques MITRE ATT&CK links to this group from public reporting, grouped by tactic. A technique can sit under more than one tactic.
Resource Development 6
Initial Access 2
Execution 9
- T1047 (Windows Management Instrumentation)
- T1053.005 (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task)
- T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell)
- T1059.003 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell)
- T1059.005 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic)
- T1106 (Native API)
- T1204.001 (User Execution: Malicious Link)
- T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File)
- T1559.001 (Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model)
Persistence 4
Privilege Escalation 3
Stealth 17
- T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information)
- T1027.004 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery)
- T1027.010 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation)
- T1027.012 (Obfuscated Files or Information: LNK Icon Smuggling)
- T1027.015 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Compression)
- T1027.016 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Junk Code Insertion)
- T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location)
- T1055 (Process Injection)
- T1070.004 (Indicator Removal: File Deletion)
- T1140 (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information)
- T1218.005 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta)
- T1218.011 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32)
- T1221 (Template Injection)
- T1480 (Execution Guardrails)
- T1497.001 (Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks)
- T1564.003 (Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window)
- T1620 (Reflective Code Loading)
Defense Impairment 2
Discovery 9
- T1012 (Query Registry)
- T1016.001 (System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery)
- T1033 (System Owner/User Discovery)
- T1057 (Process Discovery)
- T1082 (System Information Discovery)
- T1083 (File and Directory Discovery)
- T1120 (Peripheral Device Discovery)
- T1497.001 (Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks)
- T1518.001 (Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery)
Lateral Movement 4
Collection 5
Command and Control 12
- T1001 (Data Obfuscation)
- T1071.001 (Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols)
- T1090 (Proxy)
- T1090.003 (Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy)
- T1095 (Non-Application Layer Protocol)
- T1102 (Web Service)
- T1102.002 (Web Service: Bidirectional Communication)
- T1102.003 (Web Service: One-Way Communication)
- T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)
- T1568 (Dynamic Resolution)
- T1568.001 (Dynamic Resolution: Fast Flux DNS)
- T1571 (Non-Standard Port)