Turla (Secret Blizzard)
FSB Center 16's long-running espionage group: Snake, Kazuar and STOCKSTAY implants, mail-server backdoors, and a habit of hijacking other hackers' access to reach diplomats and militaries.
- Active
- 2004 (Snake development from late 2003) to July 2026
- Origin
- Russia (FSB Center 16, per the US, UK and Five Eyes partners; Unit 61240, per France)
- Type
- State-sponsored
- Affiliates
- FSB Center 16, Unit 61240, Snake/Uroburos operators, UNC4210, UAC-0024, UAC-0003, cooperation with Gamaredon (per ESET), hijacked OilRig and Storm-0156 infrastructure
- Regions targeted
- Europe, Ukraine, France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Eastern Europe, former Soviet states, Central Asia, Afghanistan, India, Middle East, United States, Brazil, Russia (foreign embassies in Moscow)
- MITRE ATT&CK
- G0010
What each vendor calls it
- Microsoft
- Secret Blizzard
- CrowdStrike
- KryptonSnakeVenomous Bear
- Google / Mandiant
- UNC4210
- Sophos / Secureworks
- IRON HUNTER
- Kaspersky
- TurlaWhiteBear
- Symantec
- Waterbug
- IBM X-Force
- ITG12
Also known as ATG26ATK13BELUGASTURGEON AccentureBlue PythonGroup 88Hippo TeamMAKERSMARKPacifier APTPfinetPopeyeSIG23Skipper TurlaSUMMITTAG_0530TURLA RELICUAC-0003 CERT-UAUAC-0024 CERT-UAUAC-0144 CERT-UAUroburosWRAITH
Profile
Turla is Russia’s longest-running known cyber espionage operation, and one of the most patient. Governments have now named its sponsor several times over. The May 2023 Five Eyes advisory on the Snake implant attributes Snake, and the wider Turla toolset, to a unit within Center 16 of the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service, and says Snake’s development and daily operations were run by FSB officers in Ryazan. On July 13, 2026, France went further: its foreign ministry attributed years of espionage against French ministries to FSB Center 16, specifically Unit 61240, building on the Turla intrusion set, and CERT-FR’s companion report says the group has collected intelligence worldwide since at least 2004. The European Union publicly blamed the 16th Centre for cyber espionage and sabotage against member states the same day, alongside a sanctions package of nine people and four entities.
The roots go back further still. CISA and its partners date Snake’s development, originally under the name Uroburos, to late 2003. ESET traces ComRAT to Agent.BTZ, the malware behind the 2008 breach of the US military. Kaspersky and academic researchers have floated a link between Turla’s Linux backdoor and the 1990s Moonlight Maze intrusions, but rate it as a circumstantial hypothesis, not a finding. The mission has stayed constant across that span: steal documents and email from foreign ministries, embassies, militaries, defense suppliers and research bodies. MITRE ATT&CK counts victims in more than 50 countries, and the Five Eyes agencies found Snake infrastructure in more than 50 as well.
Turla’s signature is tradecraft few other groups bother with. Kaspersky showed in 2015 that it hijacked downstream-only satellite internet links in the Middle East and Africa to hide its command servers, a trick it used for close to eight years. It has buried backdoors inside mail systems: an Outlook add-in that took orders through PDF attachments, T1071.003 (Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols), and LightNeuron, an Exchange T1505.002 (Server Software Component: Transport Agent) that reads commands hidden in images, T1001.002 (Data Obfuscation: Steganography). Snake itself was a peer-to-peer network of infected machines relaying traffic for each other, and Microsoft’s May 2026 analysis shows the newer Kazuar has been rebuilt along the same lines: infected hosts elect one “leader” that alone talks to the outside world, while the rest stay quiet.
The most distinctive habit is freeloading on other hackers. The UK’s NCSC and the NSA reported in 2019 that Turla had taken over Iranian OilRig tools and infrastructure and used them against Middle East victims, apparently without the Iranians knowing. Mandiant found it re-registering expired domains of the old Andromeda botnet in 2022 to pick Ukrainian targets from infected USB drives. In December 2024 Microsoft said Secret Blizzard (its name for the group) had used the tools or infrastructure of at least six other actors in seven years, including the servers of a Pakistani espionage group and a criminal Amadey botnet to reach Ukrainian military devices. ESET added a twist in 2025: fellow FSB group Gamaredon used its own tools to install and restart Kazuar on Ukrainian machines, the first documented collaboration between the two.
The war in Ukraine has shifted the tempo and the targets. Since 2022 CERT-UA (which tracks the activity as UAC-0024 and UAC-0003) has reported CAPIBAR and Kazuar attacks on Ukraine’s defense forces, with Exchange servers turned into command servers. Google’s threat intelligence group documented a new .NET backdoor, STOCKSTAY, aimed mainly at Ukrainian government and military targets and at entities linked to Italy’s foreign affairs ministry; one November 2025 wave used a WinRAR flaw (CVE-2025-8088) against about 20 Ukrainian targets, and the malware is set to work only office hours on weekdays. Outside Ukraine, Talos caught Turla in Polish NGOs supporting Ukraine in late 2023, and Microsoft found it abusing an ISP-level position to push malware on foreign embassies in Moscow, T1557 (Adversary-in-the-Middle), a campaign Microsoft thinks Russia’s lawful-intercept system probably makes possible.
Initial access is usually quiet rather than clever. The 2014 Epic Turla campaign combined spearphishing, T1566.001 (Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment), with more than 100 watering-hole sites, T1189 (Drive-by Compromise), and two zero-days. More recent waves rely on malicious RDP and HTA files, fake installers and compromised websites used as relays, T1584 (Compromise Infrastructure). The group runs layered implants so it can survive a cleanup: Talos describes TinyTurla as a deliberate “second-chance” backdoor dressed up as a Windows service.
Two cautions on attribution. Kaspersky found code overlaps between Kazuar and the SolarWinds Sunburst backdoor in 2021, but explicitly declined to attribute Sunburst to Turla. And in 2023 it reported that the separate Tomiris group also uses KopiLuwak and TunnusSched (QUIETCANARY), tools long credited to Turla, so some older attributions may be wrong. Naming is crowded: Microsoft says Secret Blizzard, CrowdStrike Venomous Bear, Palo Alto Networks Pensive Ursa, Symantec Waterbug, Secureworks IRON HUNTER and Mandiant tracked the Ukraine cluster as UNC4210 (full list above).
Events
| Date | Target | Narrative | Source | Our coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-13 | French ministries and diplomatic, defense, justice and technology entities; EU member states | France formally attributes Turla espionage to FSB Center 16 (Unit 61240), citing a February 2025 breach of a research institute working for the French defense industry that took a significant amount of data. The EU blames the 16th Centre the same day and sanctions nine people and four entities. | French foreign ministry, CERT-FR, EEAS | |
| 2026-05 | Government and diplomatic organizations in Europe and Central Asia; Ukrainian systems | Microsoft details Kazuar rebuilt as a modular peer-to-peer botnet with Kernel, Bridge and Worker modules; one elected leader handles all outside traffic over HTTP, WebSockets or Exchange Web Services. Some Ukrainian victims had earlier been compromised by Aqua Blizzard. | Microsoft | |
| 2025-11 to 2025-12 | A government body in Kazakhstan; a government agency in Romania | New modular .NET toolset Cereal on Microsoft Exchange servers: CerealBox is injected into EdgeTransport.exe and wraps existing transport agents to copy mail with attachments, T1114 (Email Collection), set in Romania to keep messages exchanged with NATO and EU addresses. The passive CerealNeuron backdoor listens on Exchange-lookalike paths, so the victim’s own server is the control point. ESET attributes it to Turla with high confidence. | ESET | Our story |
| 2023-09 to 2025-11 | Ukrainian government and military; entities linked to Italy’s foreign affairs ministry | STOCKSTAY .NET backdoor delivered through malicious RDP files, a fake military pay calculator HTA, fake installers and, in November 2025, drone-themed RAR archives exploiting WinRAR CVE-2025-8088 against about 20 Ukrainian targets. In a January 2024 incident it was pushed with Kazuar through a malicious Group Policy object, T1484.001 (Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification). | Google Threat Intelligence Group | |
| 2025-02 to 2025-06 | High-profile Ukrainian organizations | Gamaredon tools (PteroGraphin, PteroOdd, PteroPaste) used to restart Kazuar v3 and deploy Kazuar v2 on machines Gamaredon had compromised. ESET has high confidence the two FSB-linked groups are cooperating. | ESET | |
| 2024 to 2025 | Foreign embassies and diplomatic organizations in Moscow | From an ISP or telecom position, targets are sent to a fake captive portal and prompted to run ApolloShadow, which installs rogue root certificates, T1553.004 (Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate), to allow TLS interception and adds a local admin account. Microsoft observed it in February 2025. | Microsoft | |
| 2024-01 to 2024-04 | Devices tied to the Ukrainian military, some connecting through Starlink | Amadey bots linked to the criminal cluster Storm-1919, and a PowerShell backdoor from the Russian group Storm-1837, used to deliver the Tavdig loader and KazuarV2. Tavdig was side-loaded through a legitimate Symantec binary, T1574.001 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL). | Microsoft | |
| 2022-12 to 2024-10 | Afghan government bodies; Indian military and defense institutions | Turla takes over command servers and operator workstations of Pakistan-based Storm-0156 (SideCopy/Transparent Tribe overlap), then deploys its TwoDash and Statuezy tools into Afghan networks and harvests data Storm-0156 had stolen from India. Lumen counts 33 compromised C2 nodes. | Microsoft, Lumen | |
| 2023-10 to 2024-01 | Polish NGOs, including one supporting Ukraine | TinyTurla-NG backdoor runs as a disguised service, T1543.003 (Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service), with command servers on compromised WordPress sites. TurlaPower-NG scripts steal password-manager key material, and a custom Chisel tunnel moves data out. | Cisco Talos, Cisco Talos | |
| 2022 to 2023-07 | Ukrainian defense forces | CAPIBAR (Microsoft: DeliveryCheck) and Kazuar used for espionage; CAPIBAR was also planted on Exchange servers to turn them into command servers. Unit 42 says the Kazuar variant hunts Signal messages, source code and cloud credentials. | CERT-UA, Unit 42 | |
| 2023-05 | Snake-infected computers in at least 50 countries, including the US | FBI Operation MEDUSA uses a tool called PERSEUS to make Snake disable itself. The Five Eyes advisory lists government networks, research facilities and journalists as victims, plus US education, media, finance and manufacturing. | US Justice Department, CISA AA23-129A | |
| 2022-09 | Ukrainian organization | UNC4210 re-registers expired Andromeda botnet domains to profile victims infected via USB, T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media), then drops KopiLuwak and QUIETCANARY. Mandiant calls it suspected Turla; Kaspersky later found Tomiris also uses these tools. | Mandiant | |
| 2021-09 | Victims in the US, Germany and Afghanistan | TinyTurla installed as a fake “Windows Time Service”, T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location), as a backup way back in if the main implant is removed. Talos thinks the Afghan victims were in the pre-Taliban government. | Cisco Talos | |
| 2020 to 2024 | A European foreign ministry and three of its diplomatic missions in the Middle East | LunarWeb on servers and LunarMail as an Outlook add-in, T1137.006 (Office Application Startup: Add-ins), both hiding commands in images. ESET attributes them to Turla with medium confidence. | ESET | |
| 2017-04 to 2020-01 | Two foreign ministries and a national parliament | ComRAT v4 takes commands and sends stolen data through the Gmail web interface, so no malicious domain is needed. | ESET | |
| 2015 to 2020 | Foreign ministry of an EU country | Crutch document stealer exfiltrates through Dropbox, T1567.002 (Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage); ESET ties it to the Gazer backdoor. | ESET | |
| 2017 to 2019 | French armed forces ministry, French embassy in Moscow, a French judicial entity | France says Turla targeted Ministry for the Armed Forces email accounts in 2017, the foreign ministry network at its Moscow embassy in 2018 and a judicial-sector server in 2019. | French foreign ministry | |
| 2017-11 to 2018 | 13 organizations in 10 countries: foreign and interior ministries, government, ICT, education | Symantec sees Waterbug take over Iranian Crambus (OilRig) infrastructure to attack a Middle East target, and deploy a new Exchange backdoor, Neptun. The NCSC and NSA later confirm Turla used Iranian tools and scanned for its web shells in at least 35 countries. | Symantec, NCSC | |
| 2018-03 | Embassies and consulates in Eastern Europe | Mosquito campaign switches to Metasploit as a first stage, delivered through a fake Flash installer that ESET thinks was pushed by intercepting traffic to Adobe’s site. | ESET | |
| 2017-03 to 2017-12 | German Federal Foreign Office; two other European foreign offices; a major defense contractor | Outlook backdoor persisting through COM hijacking, T1546.015 (Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking), steals mail for most of 2017 after entry through Germany’s Federal College of Public Administration. | ESET | |
| 2016 to 2017 | Embassies, consulates and ministries, mainly in Southeastern Europe and former Soviet states | Spearphishing installs the Skipper first stage, then the Gazer (Kaspersky: WhiteBear) backdoor, with compromised websites as C2 proxies. | ESET | |
| 2014 to 2019 | A foreign ministry, a regional diplomatic organization, an organization in Brazil | LightNeuron runs as a Microsoft Exchange transport agent, reading commands hidden in PDF and JPG attachments and blocking those emails from users. | ESET | |
| 2014-08 | Several hundred computers in more than 45 countries: ministries, embassies, military, research, pharmaceutical firms | Epic Turla: spearphishing with Adobe Reader zero-day CVE-2013-3346 and Windows zero-day CVE-2013-5065, T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), plus more than 100 watering-hole sites; Epic (Tavdig/Wipbot) victims are upgraded to the Carbon backdoor. | Kaspersky | |
| 2007 to 2015 | Not applicable (infrastructure) | Command servers hidden behind hijacked downstream-only satellite internet links in the Middle East and Africa. | Kaspersky | |
| 2008 | US military | Agent.BTZ, an early ComRAT version able to spread through removable drives, used in a breach of US military networks. | ESET | |
| 2003 to 2004 | Not applicable (development) | Snake development begins as Uroburos in late 2003, with operations from around 2004; Five Eyes agencies say they tracked it for almost 20 years. | CISA AA23-129A |
Target vectors risk profile
| Diplomatic | Government | Defense | Espionage | Education/research | Dissidents/NGOs | Media/journalists | Technology/SaaS | Telecom | Finance | Critical infrastructure | Disruption/wiper | Ransomware/extortion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | High | High | High | Medium | Medium | Medium | Medium | Low | Low | Low | N/A | N/A |
Malware and tools
| Name | What it does | Public detection | Hunt Leads | Reports |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cereal (CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, CerealBox, CerealRunner, CerealHermit) | .NET toolset on Exchange servers that hooks mail flow inside EdgeTransport.exe to copy selected email and takes commands over Exchange-lookalike HTTPS paths | SHA1 indicators in ESET’s malware-ioc repository | 4 Hunt Leads | ESET |
| Snake (Uroburos) | Flagship kernel-level implant that turns victims into a peer-to-peer relay network; disrupted by the FBI in 2023 | YARA and Suricata rules in CISA AA23-129A; community YARA in signature-base | CISA AA23-129A | |
| Kazuar | .NET backdoor, now a modular peer-to-peer botnet that steals files, keystrokes, screenshots and email | Indicators in the Microsoft and Unit 42 reports and Unit 42’s IOC repository | Microsoft, Unit 42, ESET | |
| STOCKSTAY | Three-part .NET backdoor (STOCKBROKER, STOCKMARKET, STOCKTRADER) that talks to its server over WebSockets | YARA rules in GTIG’s report | Google Threat Intelligence Group | |
| ApolloShadow | Installs rogue root certificates and a local admin account so traffic can be intercepted | Indicators and hunting queries in Microsoft’s report | Microsoft | |
| Tavdig (Epic, Wipbot), TwoDash, Statuezy | First-stage loader and reconnaissance tools; TwoDash is a .NET downloader, Statuezy a clipboard monitor | Indicators in the Microsoft and Lumen reports | Microsoft, Lumen, Kaspersky | |
| TinyTurla, TinyTurla-NG, TurlaPower-NG | Small backup backdoors installed as fake Windows services, plus PowerShell file-theft scripts | Indicators in Talos’s IOC repository | Cisco Talos, Cisco Talos | |
| CAPIBAR (DeliveryCheck, GAMEDAY) | Backdoor used against Ukraine’s defense forces, also deployed to Exchange servers as a command server | Indicators in CERT-UA’s alert | CERT-UA | |
| KopiLuwak, QUIETCANARY (TunnusSched) | JavaScript reconnaissance tool and small .NET backdoor; Kaspersky says Tomiris uses both too | Indicators in Mandiant’s report | Mandiant, Kaspersky | |
| LightNeuron, Outlook backdoor, LunarMail | Mail-server and Outlook implants that take commands hidden in email attachments | Indicators and YARA in ESET’s malware-ioc repository | ESET, ESET, ESET | |
| ComRAT (Agent.BTZ) | Long-lived backdoor; version 4 uses the Gmail web interface for commands | Indicators in ESET’s malware-ioc repository | ESET | |
| Crutch, Gazer, Mosquito, Carbon | Second-stage backdoors and document stealers from the 2010s, Crutch exfiltrating through Dropbox | Indicators in ESET’s malware-ioc repository | ESET, ESET, ESET |
Reports
Vulnerabilities exploited
| Vulnerability | CVSS | Severity | Publisher | Platform | CISA KEV |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-8088 | 8.8 | High | RARLAB | WinRAR for Windows | Yes |
| CVE-2013-5065 | 7.8 | High | Microsoft | Windows XP and Server 2003 (NDProxy.sys) | Yes |
| CVE-2013-3346 | 9.8 | Critical | Adobe | Adobe Reader and Acrobat | Yes |
| CVE-2012-1723 | 9.8 | Critical | Oracle | Java SE (JRE) | Yes |
If you’re in their sights
Do this now
- Patch WinRAR and other archive tools, and block or quarantine .rdp, .hta and archive attachments from outside senders. Turla’s recent Ukraine waves came in through exactly those files, often themed on drones, pay or diplomacy.
- If you have staff in Russia, assume the local network is hostile: send all traffic through an encrypted tunnel to a network you trust, never install anything a captive portal or Wi-Fi login page offers, and alert on new root certificates appearing on laptops.
- Audit your mail stack. List every Exchange transport agent and Outlook add-in, look for COM hijacks that load with Outlook, and watch for mailboxes sending or receiving odd attachments to nobody in particular. Turla has lived inside email for more than a decade.
- When you find someone else’s malware (a commodity botnet, a USB worm, another country’s APT), hunt for Turla as well before you close the case. It has repeatedly arrived through access another group already had.
- Alert on new Windows services posing as system ones, new Microsoft Defender exclusions, Group Policy changes on domain controllers and steady small uploads during office hours. These are how its backup backdoors and Kazuar hide.
Compiled from the French foreign ministry, CERT-FR, the EU, CISA and Five Eyes partners, the US Justice Department, the NCSC, CERT-UA, Microsoft, Google Threat Intelligence Group, Mandiant, ESET, Kaspersky, Cisco Talos, Unit 42, Symantec, Lumen and MITRE ATT&CK, plus ThreatRoundup reporting. Last reviewed November 11, 2026.
ATT&CK techniques (68)
Techniques MITRE ATT&CK links to this group from public reporting, grouped by tactic. A technique can sit under more than one tactic.
Resource Development 7
- T1583.006 (Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services)
- T1584.003 (Compromise Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server)
- T1584.004 (Compromise Infrastructure: Server)
- T1584.006 (Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services)
- T1587.001 (Develop Capabilities: Malware)
- T1588.001 (Obtain Capabilities: Malware)
- T1588.002 (Obtain Capabilities: Tool)
Initial Access 3
Execution 7
- T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell)
- T1059.003 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell)
- T1059.005 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic)
- T1059.006 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python)
- T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript)
- T1106 (Native API)
- T1204.001 (User Execution: Malicious Link)
Persistence 6
- T1078.003 (Valid Accounts: Local Accounts)
- T1112 (Modify Registry)
- T1546.003 (Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription)
- T1546.013 (Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile)
- T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder)
- T1547.004 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL)
Privilege Escalation 9
- T1055 (Process Injection)
- T1055.001 (Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection)
- T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)
- T1078.003 (Valid Accounts: Local Accounts)
- T1134.002 (Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token)
- T1546.003 (Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription)
- T1546.013 (Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile)
- T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder)
- T1547.004 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL)
Stealth 10
- T1027.005 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools)
- T1027.010 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation)
- T1027.011 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage)
- T1036.005 (Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location)
- T1055 (Process Injection)
- T1055.001 (Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection)
- T1078.003 (Valid Accounts: Local Accounts)
- T1134.002 (Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token)
- T1140 (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information)
- T1564.012 (Hide Artifacts: File/Path Exclusions)
Defense Impairment 3
Credential Access 2
Discovery 18
- T1007 (System Service Discovery)
- T1012 (Query Registry)
- T1016 (System Network Configuration Discovery)
- T1016.001 (System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery)
- T1018 (Remote System Discovery)
- T1049 (System Network Connections Discovery)
- T1057 (Process Discovery)
- T1069.001 (Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups)
- T1069.002 (Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups)
- T1082 (System Information Discovery)
- T1083 (File and Directory Discovery)
- T1087.001 (Account Discovery: Local Account)
- T1087.002 (Account Discovery: Domain Account)
- T1120 (Peripheral Device Discovery)
- T1124 (System Time Discovery)
- T1201 (Password Policy Discovery)
- T1518.001 (Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery)
- T1615 (Group Policy Discovery)
Lateral Movement 2
Collection 4
Command and Control 7
Software MITRE links to this group (30)
Arp Carbon certutil ComRAT Crutch Empire Epic Gazer HyperStack IronNetInjector Kazuar KOPILUWAK LightNeuron LunarLoader LunarMail LunarWeb Mimikatz Mosquito NBTscan nbtstat Net netstat Penquin PowerStallion PsExec Reg Systeminfo Tasklist TinyTurla Uroburos
ThreatRoundup coverage
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