Critical 5 Hunt LeadsIOCsBleepingComputer

Hijacked MSP Accounts Plant Rogue ScreenConnect Clients on Customer PCs

Huntress caught attackers inside MSPs' ScreenConnect accounts installing rogue ScreenConnect clients on at least 286 customer endpoints across 47 organizations; ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions as a precaution.

Attackers are turning managed service providers’ own remote-support tool against their customers. BleepingComputer reports that Huntress spotted a campaign on Wednesday, Nov. 11, in which intruders inside MSPs’ cloud-hosted ScreenConnect accounts pushed rogue ScreenConnect clients onto managed PCs. Huntress counted six compromised MSPs and at least 286 endpoints across 47 organizations, and says the numbers are still climbing. ConnectWise has confirmed unauthorized access to partner accounts and disabled five third-party extensions in about 400 partner environments as a precaution.

For defenders

What’s confirmed: ConnectWise’s advisory confirms unauthorized access to ScreenConnect partner accounts and unauthorized remote-access software installed in customer environments. Huntress says this is abuse of legitimate features with custom tooling, sometimes compiled on the victim’s machine, not a software bug; no CVE. How the attackers got into the MSP accounts isn’t known. Huntress’s telemetry points to stolen credentials or hijacked operator sessions (T1078 (Valid Accounts), T1199 (Trusted Relationship)).

How it spreads: the attackers use ScreenConnect’s Run Command feature to install a second, rogue ScreenConnect client on managed endpoints, giving them access outside the MSP’s own instance (T1072 (Software Deployment Tools), T1219 (Remote Access Tools)). Installer requests carry a tag like c=Exploited<N>; Huntress says the sequential numbers suggest other MSPs were hit earlier. ConnectWise has unconfirmed reports that technicians’ own workstations were compromised when they opened an interactive session to an infected device; the mechanism hasn’t been published.

The extensions: ConnectWise disabled Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link in its cloud. On-premises customers must disable them by hand. Having them installed doesn’t mean you were breached, and disabling them doesn’t remove anything already planted.

Earlier trace: BleepingComputer found a July 2026 batch file, SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat, posing as a Social Security statement, that checks for one of the rogue client IDs, adds Defender exclusions and persists via the Startup folder and Run key (T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder)). How it relates to this week’s attacks is unclear.

Network
185.99.255[.]28 (attacker relay, hostname “screen”)
newnewnew.gotdns[.]org (C2)
soxnewwork.homedns[.]org (C2)
cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com (possible C2)
sc.payproofkit[.]com (secondary C2)
155.94.150[.]39 (sc.payproofkit host, WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1)
hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4 (stager)

Host
Rogue ScreenConnect client IDs: 2588ef5c15954b10, ed630cc2c873b091
Installer pattern: /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?…&c=Exploited<N>
Attacker account name: Addmin
Panel-Lateral.ps1 · runnew.cmd · ToolboxRelayUploader.exe · Run-Lateral-Full.bat
SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat (SHA256 60142ea5daebbf94a2dec4009f673d9822a2fd796ac55478be1edea3136ef4bb)

What it means for you

If an IT company looks after your office computers, it probably connects to them with a remote-support tool like ScreenConnect. In this campaign, attackers got into the IT company’s account and used that trusted connection to install their own copy, so they can come back to your PCs whenever they like. You can’t fix this yourself, but you can ask the right question today.

Do this now

  1. Small businesses: ask your IT provider whether it uses ScreenConnect, whether it was affected, and what it has checked on your machines.
  2. MSPs: disable the five listed extensions on on-premises servers, rotate ScreenConnect credentials and enforce MFA on every partner account.
  3. Review Run Command history, extension installs, Toolbox records and authentication logs, even if you got no alerts.
  4. Don’t open interactive sessions to suspect endpoints; investigate them with separate security tools, as ConnectWise advises.

Source article: Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations
Publisher: BleepingComputer
Published: Nov. 11, 2026
URL: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/

Executive Summary

An unnamed actor (no vendor has attributed the activity to a tracked group) is abusing cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances belonging to managed service providers to plant rogue ScreenConnect clients on the MSPs’ customer endpoints. Huntress first detected the campaign around 17:47 UTC on Nov. 11, 2026 and, by the time BleepingComputer reported it, was tracking six compromised MSPs and more than 286 affected endpoints across 47 organizations, with numbers rising; ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to partner accounts and unauthorized remote-access software in customer environments, and disabled five third-party Extensions-marketplace add-ons (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link) across roughly 400 partner environments as a precaution, while warning that on-premises servers must be cleaned up by their owners. Initial access to the MSP accounts is not established; Huntress telemetry points to compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions, and ConnectWise suspects the actor deployed software through the third-party extensions. From inside the MSP instance the actor uses the Run Command feature to install a second ScreenConnect client that reports to attacker infrastructure (relay 185.99.255[.]28, C2 on dynamic-DNS hostnames, secondary C2 sc.payproofkit[.]com), with installer requests tagged c=Exploited<N> and scripts named Panel-Lateral.ps1, runnew.cmd, Run-Lateral-Full.bat and ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, some tooling compiled on the victim host. Sequential tags suggest earlier, undetected MSP compromises, and ConnectWise has unconfirmed reports of technician workstations being compromised during interactive sessions with infected devices. BleepingComputer also linked one rogue client ID to a July 2026 Social Security-themed batch file that installed ScreenConnect, though the relationship is unclear. The objective is durable remote access to many downstream organizations at once; no data theft or ransomware has been reported yet. Hunt leads, false positive expectations and indicators are detailed below; no detection rules have been published.

ATT&CK chain: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Defense Evasion → Command and Control

Hunt Lead Grid

Hunt Lead Level Hunt Lead Name ATT&CK Risk of False Positives
1 (Junior) Rogue ScreenConnect Infrastructure and Client ID Sweep T1219 (Remote Access Tools) Low. The relay IP, C2 hostnames and two client IDs are attacker-assigned values published by Huntress; legitimate ScreenConnect traffic goes to the MSP’s own instance and relay, so the lead anchors on these exact values rather than on ScreenConnect in general.
1 (Junior) Run Command History and Third-Party Extension Audit T1072 (Software Deployment Tools) Low. Technicians use Run Command daily, but not to download ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with an “Exploited” tag or to run the published script names; the lead anchors on those strings and on the five named extensions.
2 (Pro) Second ScreenConnect Client Instance on a Managed Endpoint T1219 (Remote Access Tools) Medium. Endpoints that are supported by more than one vendor or that moved between MSPs can legitimately carry two ScreenConnect services; the lead anchors on a new client service whose relay host is not on the approved list.
2 (Pro) Attacker Scripts and On-Host Compilation Spawned by ScreenConnect T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell), T1059.003 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell), T1027.004 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery) Medium. ScreenConnect legitimately launches PowerShell and cmd for support work; compilers such as csc.exe launched under the ScreenConnect client, or the named script files, are rare and are the anchor.
3 (Elite) Run Command Fan-Out to Rogue Client Install Across Customers T1072 (Software Deployment Tools), T1219 (Remote Access Tools), T1199 (Trusted Relationship) Medium. Mass software rollouts through ScreenConnect happen during planned maintenance; the lead anchors on the same command reaching many endpoints across several customer tenants in a short window, from an operator session that is new or unusual, followed by new outbound connections to a non-approved relay.

Rogue ScreenConnect Infrastructure and Client ID Sweep

Huntress observed rogue ScreenConnect clients appearing on monitored endpoints from about 17:47 UTC on Nov. 11, 2026, reporting to an attacker relay at 185.99.255[.]28 (hostname “screen”) and to C2 hostnames newnewnew.gotdns[.]org and soxnewwork.homedns[.]org, with cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com as a possible additional C2 and sc.payproofkit[.]com (155.94.150[.]39, hostname WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) as a secondary C2; a stager was served from hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4. The rogue clients carry the attacker-assigned IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091, and the operator account name is Addmin. BleepingComputer separately found that a July 2026 batch file, SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat, checked for one of those IDs after installing ScreenConnect from cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com and an attacker cloud instance, cyberrexdesign.screenconnect[.]com, and contacted amexsafekeyupdate[.]com for install commands. The detection logic is a retrospective search for any DNS query or connection to these hosts and addresses, and a registry and service sweep for ScreenConnect client services whose configuration contains either client ID (ScreenConnect client services are named ScreenConnect Client (<id>) and store the relay host in the service ImagePath arguments).

Use DNS resolver logs, firewall and proxy logs, NetFlow, and EDR network and registry telemetry, plus an inventory query of installed services across every managed endpoint. Sweep back to at least July 2026, given the earlier batch file and Huntress’s warning that sequential tags imply older compromises. Scope first to endpoints managed through ScreenConnect by an MSP, then to MSP technician workstations. Dynamic-DNS parent domains such as gotdns.org and homedns.org host many legitimate customers, so block and alert on the exact subdomains, not the parent zones; likewise, never block screenconnect.com broadly, which would cut off legitimate support. Network indicators change quickly, so a clean result is not proof of safety; pair it with the second-client lead. Any hit should be treated as an active intrusion: isolate the endpoint using a tool other than ScreenConnect and escalate to incident response.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1219 (Remote Access Tools)

Sources: “Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations”, BleepingComputer, Nov. 11, 2026, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ (source article; Huntress indicators and BleepingComputer’s July sample)

Run Command History and Third-Party Extension Audit

Inside compromised MSP instances the actor used ScreenConnect’s Run Command feature to push the rogue client installer, requesting /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi with a query string ending in c=Exploited<N>, where N increments per victim, and ran scripts named Panel-Lateral.ps1, runnew.cmd and Run-Lateral-Full.bat. ConnectWise suspects the actor deployed additional remote-access software through five independent third-party extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link) and told partners to review authentication logs, extension installation records, administrative activity, Run Command history and Toolbox records. The detection logic is a review of every ScreenConnect server’s audit data for Run Command entries containing ClientSetup.msi, “Exploited”, the four script or tool names, or downloads from hosts outside the MSP’s own instance; for any of the five extensions installed or enabled, with the install date and installing account; for Toolbox uploads such as ToolboxRelayUploader.exe; and for logins by the account Addmin or from unfamiliar locations.

Pull the ScreenConnect Administration audit log and session event database on on-premises servers, and the cloud instance’s audit export for hosted ones, and forward them to a SIEM if they are not already there. Review the full retained history, not just the days since Nov. 11, because the tag numbering implies earlier victims. Scope to every ScreenConnect instance the MSP operates, including test and legacy instances. Extensions are legitimate add-ons that many partners installed for convenience, so the presence of one is a prompt to review, not proof of compromise; anchor on the extension being used to deploy software or on install dates that no administrator recognizes. Disabling the extensions is the right containment step but not remediation, as ConnectWise notes, since anything already deployed stays in place. A matching Run Command entry identifies every endpoint the command reached; feed that list into the second-client lead and escalate.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Execution, Lateral Movement → T1072 (Software Deployment Tools)

Sources: BleepingComputer (above), source article; ConnectWise security advisories page, https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories (as cited in the source article)

Second ScreenConnect Client Instance on a Managed Endpoint

The core of the campaign is a second ScreenConnect client installed alongside the MSP’s legitimate one, giving the actor access that survives even if the MSP instance is cleaned or its credentials are reset. Because ScreenConnect is signed, legitimate software, the binaries themselves are not malicious; what differs is the instance the client reports to. The detection logic is to inventory, on every endpoint, all services and installed products named ScreenConnect Client (<id>) or ConnectWise Control Client, extract the relay host (h=) and port from each service’s command line, and alert when a client is new, when an endpoint has more than one, or when the relay is not one of the instances the organization or its MSP actually operates. New installs of ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi through msiexec, especially when the parent process is the existing ScreenConnect client, are the real-time version of the same signal.

Use EDR service-creation and process telemetry (Windows event 7045 for new services, Sysmon event 1 for msiexec), software inventory from the RMM, and Windows Installer event logs (MsiInstaller event 11707). Build the approved-relay list first, then run the inventory now and continuously. Look back to July 2026. Scope to every managed endpoint, and include servers, which MSPs often reach through the same tool. The main false positives are endpoints supported by two vendors or left over from a previous MSP; resolve them by confirming ownership of the relay, and remove stale clients anyway, since an unmanaged client is a standing risk. Hash blocking is the wrong control because the rogue client is the genuine signed ScreenConnect binary, and blocking it would break legitimate support; block or alert on the unapproved relay host instead. A confirmed unapproved client means attacker access: remove it, isolate the host through a separate tool, and check for other persistence before reconnecting.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1219 (Remote Access Tools)

Sources: BleepingComputer (above), source article

Attacker Scripts and On-Host Compilation Spawned by ScreenConnect

Huntress told BleepingComputer that the activity relies on custom tooling that is in some cases compiled on the fly on the victim’s computer, and it recovered attacker scripts named Panel-Lateral.ps1, runnew.cmd and Run-Lateral-Full.bat, plus a tool named ToolboxRelayUploader.exe. The script names point to lateral movement and relay setup, though the scripts’ contents have not been published, so the exact command lines are unknown. The detection logic is a process rule on endpoints: alert when the ScreenConnect client service (ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe or ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe) is the parent or grandparent of csc.exe, vbc.exe, msbuild.exe or ilasm.exe, of a newly written executable in a temporary or ScreenConnect Toolbox folder, or of PowerShell or cmd running any file with the four published names; also alert on file creation of those names anywhere.

Use EDR process lineage and file-creation telemetry (Sysmon events 1 and 11), and PowerShell script block logging (event 4104) to capture script content if a variant runs again. Baseline 30 days of child processes under ScreenConnect on representative endpoints, since technicians routinely run scripts through it; then look back to July 2026 for the specific names and for compiler launches. Scope to all managed endpoints and technician workstations. Allowlist by script hash or signed path for scripts the MSP actually uses, never by process name, since the attacker runs through the same client. Blocking PowerShell or cmd under ScreenConnect would break normal support work and is the wrong control. A compiler or a named script under ScreenConnect should be escalated; collect the compiled output and source files before cleanup, because the scripts are still unpublished and will help scope the incident. The compile-after-delivery pattern generalizes to other RMM abuse.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Execution → T1059.001 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell); Execution → T1059.003 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell); Defense Evasion → T1027.004 (Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery)

Sources: BleepingComputer (above), source article

Run Command Fan-Out to Rogue Client Install Across Customers

Huntress counted hundreds of endpoints across dozens of organizations within hours, which is only possible because one compromised MSP session can reach every customer. The behavior to catch is the shape of the abuse rather than any one indicator: an operator session in the ScreenConnect server issues the same Run Command to many endpoints in several customer groups within minutes, those endpoints run msiexec for a ScreenConnect client installer, and soon afterwards they open new outbound connections to a relay the organization does not operate. The correlation to build joins ScreenConnect server audit events (operator, source IP, command, target sessions, time) with endpoint process and network telemetry, and fires when one operator’s command reaches more than a set number of endpoints across more than one customer in a short window and is followed by new-service creation or unapproved relay connections on those endpoints; weight it higher when the operator session is new, comes from an unfamiliar IP or ASN, or logs in outside working hours.

This needs ScreenConnect audit logs in the SIEM alongside EDR data from customer endpoints, which many MSPs do not yet have; getting the server logs into the SIEM is the first step. Baseline 30 to 60 days of Run Command volume per operator and per customer group, and treat change-window rollouts as an allowlisted schedule tied to named operators. Scope to the MSP’s ScreenConnect instances and to the operator accounts that can run commands across customers. Mass rollouts are the main false positive, so anchor on the cross-customer spread, the installer type and the follow-on relay connection, not on volume alone. Reducing who can run commands across all customers, and requiring MFA and IP restrictions for those accounts, makes this alert rarer and more meaningful. A firing alert warrants immediate suspension of the operator account and escalation, and the pattern generalizes to abuse of any RMM platform an MSP uses.

Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)

ATT&CK: Execution, Lateral Movement → T1072 (Software Deployment Tools); Command and Control → T1219 (Remote Access Tools); Initial Access → T1199 (Trusted Relationship)

Sources: BleepingComputer (above), source article

Hash Appendix

July 2026 Social Security-themed ScreenConnect installer script

The SHA256 comes from the source article (BleepingComputer’s VirusTotal link); OTX AlienVault had no record for it, and no MD5 or SHA1 was published. Huntress has not published hashes for the scripts used in the current campaign.

MD5s

(not available)  # SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat -> batch script, installs ScreenConnect and checks for rogue client ID

SHA1s

(not available)  # SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat -> batch script, installs ScreenConnect and checks for rogue client ID

SHA256s

60142ea5daebbf94a2dec4009f673d9822a2fd796ac55478be1edea3136ef4bb  # SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat -> batch script, installs ScreenConnect and checks for rogue client ID

References Appendix

  • “Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations”, BleepingComputer, Nov. 11, 2026, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ (source article; Huntress indicators, ConnectWise statements, July sample)
  • ConnectWise security advisories, ConnectWise, Nov. 11, 2026, https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories (as cited in the source article)
  • MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise technique pages linked above, MITRE, https://attack.mitre.org/

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