PHP2Shell Plus a Root Zero-Day: Check Point Gateways Hijacked, ESXi Wiped
Check Point says attackers used PHP2Shell and a new root bug, CVE-2026-123039, on unpatched gateways, planted the TSGA backdoor and wiped ESXi hosts at Israeli organizations. Hotfixes are out.
Attackers broke into unpatched Check Point gateways through the Mobile Access portal, made themselves root with a second, previously unknown bug, and in some Israeli networks went on to wipe a VMware ESXi host. Check Point Research says the first wave began Oct. 30, about a week after the PHP2Shell fix shipped, and a wider wave on Nov. 2 hit organizations in several countries without destructive activity. Check Point has now released hotfixes for the root bug, CVE-2026-123039, which it says was used against “a couple of dozen customers”, BleepingComputer reports.
For defenders
The chain: PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) against the Mobile Access portal for initial access (T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application)), then CVE-2026-123039 (CVSS 7.8) to reach root (T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)). The Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon runs as root on the world-writable socket /tmp/dynamic_socket and doesn’t check who connects. Check Point lists Firewall, Security Gateway, Scalable Platforms, Security Management Server and Multi-Domain Security Management as affected. If you can’t patch yet, its interim fix is to stop dynamic_server and keep it from restarting. Our CVE data shows one public PoC repository and no KEV listing yet.
After root: PHP web shells named zz*.tpl in the portal’s login-page templates (T1505.003 (Server Software Component: Web Shell)), then the TSGA backdoor (/tmp/CPconfigdaemon, relaunched as slot_CPconfigdaemon) listening on TCP 11072, with an embedded TSProxy library written to /lib/libcpfwcommon.so and injected into appliance processes (T1055 (Process Injection)). TSGA can steal gateway configs and tamper with firewall logs. The attackers ran the gogo scanner from the gateway (T1046 (Network Service Discovery)), logged into ESXi over SSH as vpxuser (T1021.004 (Remote Services: SSH)) and ran the destroy_v6 wiper, which drops DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes (T1485 (Data Destruction)).
Who: unclear, and Check Point says so. TSGA and TSProxy come from PhiliKit, a toolset ESET tied to the China-nexus group UNC5221 in Ivanti attacks. But a wiper aimed at Israel, with a Hebrew note using the Dream Security brand, doesn’t fit that group’s usual goals. Check Point leaves several explanations open: the same actor did everything, it only sold access, or someone staged a false flag.
130.94.19[.]204
130.94.19[.]168/tmp/CPconfigdaemon, slot_CPconfigdaemon (TSGA)
/lib/libcpfwcommon.so (TSProxy)
zz*.tpl, challenge_render.tpl, /tmp/.up.tpl (web shells)
/tmp/.bd.log, /tmp/.p_sock
DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt (wiper note)What it means for you
If your company doesn’t use Check Point firewalls, nothing to do here. If it does, remember that the firewall is meant to protect everything behind it. Here it became the way in: attackers used it to reach servers deeper inside and, in some Israeli organizations, to destroy data.
Do this now
- Install Check Point’s CVE-2026-123039 hotfix from sk1000362, and make sure the gateway’s PHP2Shell fixes are on.
- If you can’t patch today, stop
dynamic_serveras Check Point describes, and take the Mobile Access portal off the internet if you don’t need it. - Look for the files and IP addresses above, and for DynamicCLI commands that bypassed the Clish wrapper (sk1000362 lists the checks).
- If you find any, treat the gateway as compromised: rebuild it, rotate its secrets, and check ESXi hosts it could reach.
Source article: PHP2Shell Exploitation on Check Point Gateway
Publisher: Check Point Research
Published: Nov. 12, 2026
URL: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/php2shell-exploitation-on-check-point-gateway/
Executive Summary
Starting Oct. 30, 2026, an operator Check Point Research does not attribute with confidence scanned for and exploited unpatched Check Point Security Gateways through their Mobile Access portals. The first wave targeted Israeli organizations and included destructive activity; a second wave on Nov. 2 reached organizations in several countries and sectors with no destruction observed, which Check Point reads as opportunistic access rather than sector targeting. In the investigated intrusion the attacker used PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) for initial access as the portal service account, then escalated to root with CVE-2026-123039, a then-unpatched flaw in which the Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon executes commands sent by any local user to the world-writable socket /tmp/dynamic_socket. With root, the operator wrote PHP web shells into the portal’s login-page templates, launched the TSGA passive backdoor with its embedded TSProxy library for encrypted access and SOCKS-style proxying, ran the gogo scanner from the gateway, moved over SSH to a VMware ESXi host with the vpxuser account, and ran the destroy_v6 wiper, which leaves DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes using the Dream Security brand. TSGA and TSProxy are modified variants of PhiliKit, a toolset ESET reported in Ivanti exploitation and associated with the China-nexus group UNC5221, and the infrastructure sat on LightNode VPS hosting with scanning concentrated in Chinese working hours; Check Point says the destructive, Israel-focused activity does not fit that group and leaves open that the operator acted alone, sold access, or staged a false flag. Check Point says CVE-2026-123039 was exploited against a couple of dozen customers and has released hotfixes. Hunt leads, false positive expectations and indicators are detailed below; no detection rules were published.
ATT&CK chain: Initial Access → Privilege Escalation → Persistence → Defense Evasion → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Impact
Hunt Lead Grid
| Hunt Lead Level | Hunt Lead Name | ATT&CK | Risk of False Positives |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (Junior) | TSGA, Web Shell and Wiper File Artifacts | T1505.003 (Server Software Component: Web Shell) | Low. The paths and names are attacker-chosen and do not occur on a clean Gaia system; the one name that imitates a product file, libcpfwcommon.so, is anchored on its location in /lib and its hash. |
| 1 (Junior) | PHP2Shell Session Markers and Portal Crashes | T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application) | Low. Normal PHP sessions never contain the upload_progress_pwn marker; crash bursts alone can come from bugs or load, so the lead anchors on the marker and treats crashes only as supporting evidence. |
| 2 (Pro) | DynamicCLI Commands That Bypass Clish | T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) | Medium. Administrators and Check Point tooling issue DynamicCLI commands every day; the lead anchors on commands that reached the daemon without the default Clish wrapper or used the system() sink, which Check Point calls uncommon or absent in legitimate use. |
| 2 (Pro) | TSGA Listener on TCP 11072 and Injected TSProxy Library | T1055 (Process Injection), T1090 (Proxy) | Low. Gaia does not listen on 11072 by default and appliance daemons do not map a library from /lib/libcpfwcommon.so; an unusual third-party agent using the port is the only expected overlap and can be confirmed by its process image. |
| 3 (Elite) | Gateway-Originated Scanning and SSH to ESXi | T1046 (Network Service Discovery), T1021.004 (Remote Services: SSH), T1485 (Data Destruction) | Medium. Management servers and monitoring legitimately reach ESXi, but a security gateway itself should not sweep internal subnets or open SSH sessions to hypervisors; the lead joins flow records with ESXi auth logs to anchor on the gateway as the source. |
TSGA, Web Shell and Wiper File Artifacts
After reaching root, the operator wrote base64-decoded PHP web shells into the Mobile Access portal’s template directory as files matching zz*.tpl, first small command shells and then a fuller version keyed with the hardcoded string zz2026 that runs OS commands, evaluates PHP and saves uploads to /tmp/.up.tpl, which was then copied into the portal directory as challenge_render.tpl. The TSGA backdoor was started as /tmp/CPconfigdaemon with output to /tmp/.bd.log, relocated itself under the name slot_CPconfigdaemon in a boot persistence directory, wrote TSProxy to /lib/libcpfwcommon.so and used the Unix socket /tmp/.p_sock. On the ESXi host the wiper was staged under /tmp and left DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt in each directory it processed. The detection logic is a file sweep of every gateway and reachable ESXi host for these exact paths and names, for any .tpl file in the portal templates that contains PHP execution functions or the string zz2026, and for the SHA256 values in the appendix, plus a network log search for 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168.
Run the sweep from expert mode or through your configuration management tooling on each gateway, and from the ESXi shell or vCenter file listings on hypervisors; search firewall and proxy logs for the two addresses back to at least Oct. 1, 2026, since PHP2Shell was public from Oct. 21. Scope to every gateway with the Mobile Access blade enabled first, then the rest of the fleet. Hash blocking is the wrong primary control because TSGA renames itself and the web shells are small text files that change easily; match on path, name and content instead. Because TSGA can tamper with binary firewall logs and back itself up into snapshots, a clean log result on a gateway that has any file hit means nothing; any hit should go straight to incident response with the gateway treated as untrusted, rebuilt rather than cleaned, and its configuration secrets rotated.
Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)
ATT&CK: Persistence → T1505.003 (Server Software Component: Web Shell)
Sources: “PHP2Shell Exploitation on Check Point Gateway”, Check Point Research, Nov. 12, 2026, https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/php2shell-exploitation-on-check-point-gateway/ (source article)
PHP2Shell Session Markers and Portal Crashes
Check Point found the first signs of exploitation on Oct. 30 as PHP session files created under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/ that contained the marker upload_progress_pwn, while the portal’s Apache and PHP workers logged hundreds of segmentation faults in the same window, consistent with repeated PHP2Shell attempts against the Mobile Access service. The detection logic is a search of the portal’s PHP session directory (the path includes the installed version, so search /opt/CPcvpn-*/tmp/) for files containing upload_progress_pwn, and a count of Apache or PHP worker segmentation faults per hour on each gateway, flagging hours far above that gateway’s normal rate and especially those that line up with session files carrying the marker.
Use file searches on the gateway itself and the Mobile Access Apache error logs, forwarded to your log platform if possible so the history survives a rebuild. Look back to Oct. 21, 2026, the PHP2Shell disclosure date, since other operators have used the same bug. Scope to gateways with Mobile Access exposed to the internet. A crash spike on its own is a weak signal and should be paired with the marker or with the file artifacts lead before escalating. Blocking the scanning addresses is not a fix because PHP2Shell is widely exploited by many sources; patching PHP2Shell on the gateway and restricting portal exposure is. A session file with the marker means exploitation was at least attempted successfully enough to write a session and should be escalated, and the detection generalizes to any PHP application hit with this exploit.
Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)
ATT&CK: Initial Access → T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application)
Sources: Check Point Research (above), source article
DynamicCLI Commands That Bypass Clish
CVE-2026-123039 exists because the Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon, dynamic_server, runs as root and accepts commands on the world-writable socket /tmp/dynamic_socket without authenticating the caller, so the portal service account the attacker held after PHP2Shell could send a command and have it run as root. Check Point’s advisory, as reported by BleepingComputer, tells customers to look for commands commonly associated with exploitation, for use of the system() sink, which it describes as uncommon or absent in legitimate traffic, and for commands that did not go through the default Clish wrapper, which indicates they were sent straight to the socket and executed as root. The detection logic is to review DynamicCLI command records for those three conditions and to alert on any process other than the expected Clish and Check Point management binaries connecting to /tmp/dynamic_socket, especially a process descended from the Mobile Access Apache or PHP workers.
Use the DynamicCLI and Clish command logs on each gateway, the Gaia audit trail, and, where available, process-to-socket telemetry from auditd or an endpoint agent supported on Gaia. Review back to Oct. 1, 2026. Scope to every product Check Point lists as affected, not only gateways with Mobile Access, since any local foothold can use this bug. Expect legitimate administrator activity through Clish; allowlist by the wrapper and the calling binary path rather than by user name, because the attacker’s commands also run in a legitimate service context. Stopping dynamic_server, Check Point’s temporary mitigation, removes the attack path but also the evidence stream, so collect the logs first. Any command that reached the daemon without Clish or used system() should be escalated as probable compromise.
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Privilege Escalation → T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)
Sources: Check Point Research (above), source article; “Check Point warns of zero-day flaw exploited for root access”, BleepingComputer, Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/check-point-patches-zero-day-that-lets-hackers-get-root-access/ (additional source, same campaign, reporting Check Point advisory sk1000362)
TSGA Listener on TCP 11072 and Injected TSProxy Library
TSGA, which Check Point traces to the Tiny SHell-based PhiliKit implant, provides authenticated, encrypted shells, file transfer, configuration theft, snapshot persistence and firewall log tampering, and communicates over TCP port 11072 and the Unix socket /tmp/.p_sock; unlike the PhiliKit build ESET analyzed, which listened only on loopback, TSGA listens on all IPv4 interfaces. Its embedded TSProxy library, written to /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, is injected into selected appliance processes where it hooks networking functions so that specially marked attacker connections are handled covertly while ordinary traffic passes. The detection logic has two parts: alert on any listening socket or inbound connection on TCP 11072 to a gateway interface, and on any gateway process whose memory maps include /lib/libcpfwcommon.so or any library from /lib that does not belong to the installed Gaia and Check Point packages.
Use netstat or ss output collected on a schedule from each gateway, firewall and NetFlow records for traffic to the gateways’ own addresses on 11072, and process memory map listings (/proc/*/maps) gathered from expert mode. Baseline the library set per Gaia version and hotfix level so new entries stand out. Scope to all gateways and management servers. Because TSProxy rides on existing appliance services, it will not show up as a separate listening port, which is why the memory-map check matters; and because TSGA can edit firewall logs, rely on flow data collected off the box. Blocking 11072 at the perimeter is a reasonable mitigation but not a cure. Any hit is an escalation, and the library check generalizes to other appliance implants that use the same injection pattern.
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Defense Evasion → T1055 (Process Injection); Command and Control → T1090 (Proxy)
Sources: Check Point Research (above), source article
Gateway-Originated Scanning and SSH to ESXi
From the compromised gateway the operator ran the open-source gogo scanner to map internal hosts and services, then authenticated to a VMware ESXi host over SSH with the vpxuser account, the service account vCenter uses to manage hosts, staged the destroy_v6 wiper in /tmp and ran it; the wiper takes a target directory, optionally skips the zero overwrite with -f, excludes paths listed with -w, deletes files recursively and drops DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt in every directory. The correlation to build is a sequence per gateway: a burst of connections from the gateway’s own inside address to many internal hosts and ports, followed by an SSH login to any ESXi host whose source is a gateway rather than vCenter or a jump host, with vpxuser logins from anything other than vCenter’s address flagged on their own, and then mass file deletion or new DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt files on that ESXi host.
Use NetFlow or firewall logs for traffic sourced from gateway interfaces, ESXi auth.log and hostd logs forwarded to your log platform, and vCenter events. Baseline 30 days of which systems legitimately open SSH to ESXi; on most estates that is vCenter and a short list of admin hosts, and SSH on ESXi is often disabled entirely. Scope to every hypervisor reachable from a gateway’s internal interface. Disabling a public download domain or hash-blocking gogo is the wrong control because the scanner is easily rebuilt; the durable fixes are disabling ESXi SSH, restricting vpxuser to vCenter’s address and not allowing gateways to initiate management connections. Any vpxuser SSH login from a gateway should be escalated immediately, and the pattern generalizes to any edge-device compromise that pivots to virtualization.
Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)
ATT&CK: Discovery → T1046 (Network Service Discovery); Lateral Movement → T1021.004 (Remote Services: SSH); Impact → T1485 (Data Destruction)
Sources: Check Point Research (above), source article
Hash Appendix
Check Point gateway intrusion (TSGA, TSProxy, web shell, wiper)
SHA256 values come from the source article; Check Point did not publish MD5 or SHA1, and they have not been filled in from OTX or VirusTotal for this report. gogo is an open-source scanner; the hash identifies the attacker’s copy only.
MD5s
(not available) # zz*.tpl -> PHP web shell in Mobile Access templates
(not available) # slot_CPconfigdaemon -> TSGA backdoor (relaunched copy)
(not available) # CPconfigdaemon -> TSGA backdoor (/tmp/CPconfigdaemon)
(not available) # gogo -> network scanner run on the gateway
(not available) # destroy_v6 -> wiper staged on ESXi /tmp
(not available) # DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt -> wiper note
SHA1s
(not available) # zz*.tpl -> PHP web shell in Mobile Access templates
(not available) # slot_CPconfigdaemon -> TSGA backdoor (relaunched copy)
(not available) # CPconfigdaemon -> TSGA backdoor (/tmp/CPconfigdaemon)
(not available) # gogo -> network scanner run on the gateway
(not available) # destroy_v6 -> wiper staged on ESXi /tmp
(not available) # DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt -> wiper note
SHA256s
edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3 # zz*.tpl -> PHP web shell in Mobile Access templates
4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8 # slot_CPconfigdaemon -> TSGA backdoor (relaunched copy)
d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63 # CPconfigdaemon -> TSGA backdoor (/tmp/CPconfigdaemon)
3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90 # gogo -> network scanner run on the gateway
c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237 # destroy_v6 -> wiper staged on ESXi /tmp
0522937c0c0337be54fe25493539e5f5f8ceb9742c980aaff1cfc9515f3a96f7 # DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt -> wiper note
PhiliKit reference samples (Ivanti toolset)
SHA256 values from the source article, listed for comparison with the PhiliKit toolset ESET reported; MD5 and SHA1 not published.
MD5s
(not available) # philistine -> PhiliKit implant and installer (Ivanti)
(not available) # libdssafe.so -> PhiliKit networking component
SHA1s
(not available) # philistine -> PhiliKit implant and installer (Ivanti)
(not available) # libdssafe.so -> PhiliKit networking component
SHA256s
ee16e1695711b9d60c62925fcfb2fe1a29c18ae26565bc05410a14e16d2a39d7 # philistine -> PhiliKit implant and installer (Ivanti)
fb1a6235eb6bce8c9ec8cd8bb85f17c9c2bde8ecb45b7a243a30ceadf26654da # libdssafe.so -> PhiliKit networking component
References Appendix
- “PHP2Shell Exploitation on Check Point Gateway”, Check Point Research, Nov. 12, 2026, https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/php2shell-exploitation-on-check-point-gateway/ (source article; chain, artifacts, attribution, indicators)
- “Check Point warns of zero-day flaw exploited for root access”, BleepingComputer, Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/check-point-patches-zero-day-that-lets-hackers-get-root-access/ (affected products, mitigation, indication-of-compromise guidance from sk1000362)
- Check Point advisory sk1000362 (CVE-2026-123039), Check Point, Nov. 12, 2026, https://support.checkpoint.com/results/sk/sk1000362
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise technique pages linked above, MITRE, https://attack.mitre.org/
CVE at a glance
- CVSS
- 7.8 High (v3.1)
- EPSS
- 2.2% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (higher than 82.7% of CVEs)
- Exploited in the wild
- Yes, on CISA’s KEV list since Nov 13, 2026
- Public exploit
- Yes, reported in 2 GitHub repositories
- CVSS
- 9.2 Critical (v4.0)
- EPSS
- 100% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (higher than 99.9% of CVEs)
- Exploited in the wild
- Yes, on CISA’s KEV list since Oct 26, 2026
- Public exploit
- Yes, reported in Exploit-DB, a Nuclei template and 771 GitHub repositories
- CVSS
- 9.2 Critical (v4.0)
- EPSS
- 100% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days (higher than 99.9% of CVEs)
- Exploited in the wild
- Yes, on CISA’s KEV list since Oct 26, 2026
- Public exploit
- Yes, reported in a Nuclei template and 30 GitHub repositories
Data from NVD, FIRST EPSS and CISA KEV, refreshed automatically. We report whether public exploit code exists but never link to it: fake proof-of-concepts that infect researchers are common.