Medium 5 Hunt LeadsIOCsCoffeeLoaderRetadupSmokeLoaderKaspersky Securelist

Police Killed the Retadup Worm in 2019. Someone Brought It Back

Kaspersky says someone re-registered the Retadup USB worm's old C2 domains and is using surviving infections to install CoffeeLoader, hitting about 15,000 systems in 2026.

Police killed the Retadup worm in 2019. Someone has quietly brought it back. Kaspersky reports that since 2024 an unknown operator has been re-registering the domains Retadup’s bots used to phone home, then telling the still-infected machines to download new malware: first SmokeLoader, and since early 2025 the CoffeeLoader downloader. Kaspersky says its products blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in the first nine months of 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.

For defenders

The revival: Retadup is an AutoIt/AutoHotkey worm from 2017 that copies itself to every USB stick and external drive as hidden files plus shortcut (LNK) files, and infects the next PC when someone clicks the shortcut: T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media). French police took over its servers in July 2019 and wiped it from more than 850,000 machines. Its C2 protocol is simple plaintext (Base64, then hex), so Kaspersky can’t say whether the original author or a newcomer is behind the revival. A 2017 sample still gets commands today, including a download order for rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe.

The new CoffeeLoader: an NSIS installer drops a patched copy of 7-Zip’s 7z.dll into a temp folder and runs it with rundll32: T1218.011 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32). A new version of the Armoury packer now decrypts on the GPU via OpenGL. The DLL copies itself to %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% under an eight-hex-digit name (e.g. b79faace\b79faace.dll), adds a Run value that calls its SetCodecs export, and sets a StartupApproved value so Task Manager can’t switch it off: T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder). It then starts dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe and injects into it: T1055 (Process Injection). The main body comes over HTTPS from /payload?md5= (zeros on the first request), XOR-encrypted and signature-checked. Kaspersky publishes MD5s and the domains below; no CVE is involved.

Network (Kaspersky, Nov. 16, 2026)
alphanoob[.]com
newblackage[.]com
newminersage[.]com
radnewage[.]com
minernewage[.]com
rad2016.publicvm[.]com
radpal.publicvm[.]com
roro2016.linkpc[.]net
internet-speed-check[.]com
api.internet-speed-check[.]com
rurjfvn[.]rs

What it means for you

A USB stick can still carry an infection from one PC to the next, and this worm proves it. If a drive you plug in suddenly shows only shortcuts where your folders used to be, don’t click them. The worm was mostly cleaned up years ago, so the machines being hit now are old, unpatched or unprotected ones, often shared PCs in print shops, schools and internet cafés. CoffeeLoader’s job is to install whatever else its operators want next.

Do this now

  1. Make sure every Windows PC runs current security software; Defender detects this family.
  2. Treat USB sticks from shared computers as suspect, and scan them before opening anything on them.
  3. If a drive’s folders have turned into shortcuts, don’t click; copy your files off from a clean, protected PC.
  4. IT teams: block or alert on the domains above and look for rundll32 running a 7z.dll from ProgramData or AppData.

Source article: A USB worm’s second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader
Publisher: Securelist by Kaspersky (author: Oleg Kupreev)
Published: Nov. 16, 2026
URL: https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/

Executive Summary

Retadup, an AutoIt and AutoHotkey worm first seen in 2017 that spreads through USB and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts, was disinfected from more than 850,000 machines when French law enforcement seized its C2 servers in July 2019. Kaspersky reports that since 2024 an unidentified operator has been re-registering Retadup’s old C2 domains and using the plaintext Base64-then-hex command protocol to order surviving bots to download third-party malware: SmokeLoader packed with a 32-bit Armoury build at first, and from early 2025 CoffeeLoader. In the August 2026 variant an NSIS installer drops a patched 7-Zip library, 7z.dll, to a temp folder and runs it through rundll32.exe; a new Armoury packer that decrypts with OpenGL on the GPU unpacks a new CoffeeLoader downloader stage, which persists by copying the DLL to an eight-hex-digit folder under ProgramData or LocalAppData with a Run value calling its SetCodecs export, blocks Task Manager from disabling that autorun, injects into a freshly started dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe, and fetches the signed, XOR-encrypted main body over HTTPS from a /payload?md5= path. CoffeeLoader’s main module is functionally unchanged, with new traffic keys and magic value, and can inject, drop and run executables or DLLs on command, so infected hosts are a delivery channel for follow-on malware. Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in the first three quarters of 2026, mainly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia; no actor is named. Hunt leads, false positive expectations, indicators and MD5s are detailed below; no detection rules were published.

ATT&CK chain: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Defense Evasion → Command and Control

Hunt Lead Grid

Hunt Lead Level Hunt Lead Name ATT&CK Risk of False Positives
1 (Junior) Retadup and CoffeeLoader Infrastructure Sweep T1071.001 (Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols) Low. The domains are Retadup C2 names, the CoffeeLoader C2 and file hosts; the only shared infrastructure is the dynamic DNS parents publicvm and linkpc, so match the full attacker subdomains rather than the parent zones.
1 (Junior) CoffeeLoader Hex-Named Run Key Persistence T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder) Low. Legitimate software rarely registers a Run value that launches rundll32 against an eight-hex-digit DLL in a matching ProgramData or LocalAppData folder with the SetCodecs export; the triple of folder, value name and export is the anchor.
2 (Pro) Rundll32 Loading 7z.dll Outside 7-Zip T1218.011 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32) Low to Medium. 7-Zip and many installers ship 7z.dll, but they load it in-process; the lead anchors on rundll32.exe executing a 7z.dll from Temp, ProgramData or AppData, which genuine 7-Zip does not do.
2 (Pro) LNK and AutoIt Execution From Removable Drives T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media) Medium. Portable apps and kiosk tools run from USB drives; the lead anchors on Explorer-launched shortcuts on removable volumes that start AutoIt or AutoHotkey interpreters or scripts, and on hidden folders paired with same-named LNK files.
3 (Elite) Spawned System Process Injection Followed by HTTPS Payload Fetch T1055 (Process Injection) Medium. dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe and AtBroker.exe start constantly; the lead needs the join of an unusual parent (rundll32 or the persisted DLL), a mismatched command line and an outbound HTTPS connection from that child to a non-Microsoft host.

Retadup and CoffeeLoader Infrastructure Sweep

Kaspersky lists the most active revived Retadup C2 servers as alphanoob[.]com, newblackage[.]com, newminersage[.]com, radnewage[.]com, minernewage[.]com, rad2016.publicvm[.]com, radpal.publicvm[.]com and roro2016.linkpc[.]net, with a 2017 Retadup sample still beaconing to noobminer.newblackage[.]com in August 2026 using GET requests shaped like /<32 hex characters>/1/4/1/0/empty and a WinHttp-style user agent, and receiving hex-wrapped Base64 commands such as a sleep or a download order for rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe. CoffeeLoader files were hosted at rurjfvn[.]rs/update.exe and alphanoob[.]com/update.exe, and the new downloader fetches its main body from api.internet-speed-check[.]com over HTTPS at /payload?md5= with 32 zeros on the first request. The detection logic is a retrospective match of DNS queries, proxy and firewall logs against these names, plus a URL-pattern match on /payload?md5= and on the Retadup path shape where HTTP or TLS-inspected traffic is available.

Use DNS resolver logs, secure web gateway or proxy logs and EDR network telemetry, and sweep as far back as retention allows, at least to early 2025 when CoffeeLoader delivery began, because Retadup bots can sit dormant for years. Match the full subdomains on publicvm and linkpc rather than blocking those dynamic DNS parents, which unrelated users rely on, and note that the CoffeeLoader C2 sits behind Cloudflare, so its IP addresses are shared and must not be blocked or matched. Any hit means a host infected with Retadup or CoffeeLoader; escalate it, check attached removable drives, and run the persistence lead on it.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Command and Control → T1071.001 (Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols)

Sources: “A USB worm’s second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader”, Securelist (Kaspersky), Nov. 16, 2026, https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/ (source article)

CoffeeLoader Hex-Named Run Key Persistence

The CoffeeLoader downloader copies 7z.dll into a subfolder of %PROGRAMDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% whose folder name, DLL name and registry value name are the same eight hexadecimal digits derived from system volume information, for example C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll. It registers Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value such as b79faace.dll = rundll32.exe “C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll”,SetCodecs, and writes the same value name under Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run with data 080000000000000000000000 so the user cannot disable the entry from Task Manager. The detection logic is a registry and file sweep for Run values that launch rundll32 with a SetCodecs export, Run value names matching ^[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll$, and folders under ProgramData or LocalAppData named with eight hex digits containing a same-named DLL.

Query Run and StartupApproved keys across the fleet with EDR, endpoint management or a live-response script, and add a real-time rule on registry writes to those keys by rundll32.exe or by a process running from those folders. The hex name changes per machine, so never hunt on b79faace itself; key on the structure and the SetCodecs export, which is a legitimate 7-Zip codec export that has no reason to appear in an autorun. Deleting the Run value alone leaves the injected process and any follow-on payloads in place, so treat a hit as a compromised host to be reimaged or fully investigated.

Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)

ATT&CK: Persistence → T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder); Defense Evasion → T1112 (Modify Registry) for the StartupApproved write

Sources: Securelist (above), source article

Rundll32 Loading 7z.dll Outside 7-Zip

On launch, the NSIS-based CoffeeLoader installer drops 7z.dll into a temporary directory and runs it with rundll32.exe; the file is 7-Zip’s genuine library with part of its code replaced by self-decrypting shellcode, the new Armoury packer, which decrypts the next stage using an OpenGL compute shader on the GPU instead of the older OpenCL kernel. At persistence time the same DLL runs from ProgramData or LocalAppData via rundll32 with the SetCodecs export. The detection logic is a process-creation rule for rundll32.exe whose command line references a file named 7z.dll, or any DLL invoked with the SetCodecs export, from Temp, ProgramData or AppData, with an optional parent check for an NSIS installer in Downloads or Temp.

Use EDR or Sysmon process creation (Event ID 1) and image load (Event ID 7) telemetry. Genuine 7-Zip loads 7z.dll inside 7z.exe or 7zFM.exe from Program Files, and some installers bundle the library for their own extraction, so allowlist by signed parent image and install path, not by DLL name. Hash blocking 7z.dll is the wrong control: the patched file shares code with the legitimate library, and blocking legitimate 7-Zip hashes would break software. A graphics context opened by rundll32 is an additional, rarely benign signal where EDR records module loads of opengl32.dll by rundll32.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Defense Evasion → T1218.011 (System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32); T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information) for the Armoury packer

Sources: Securelist (above), source article

LNK and AutoIt Execution From Removable Drives

Retadup copies itself to all connected USB flash drives and external drives as hidden files and LNK shortcuts; when a user opens the infected drive on another PC and clicks a shortcut, the worm, written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey, installs itself and joins the botnet, which then receives download commands from the revived C2 servers. The detection logic is to alert when explorer.exe launches a shortcut on a removable volume whose target starts an AutoIt or AutoHotkey interpreter, a compiled AutoIt executable or a script host, and to sweep removable-media file events for hidden files or folders created alongside LNK files of the same name.

Use EDR process and file telemetry with drive-type context, Windows removable storage auditing (Event ID 4663 on removable volumes) and device control logs. Scope first to shared machines such as reception, lab, kiosk and print stations, which is where a worm like this keeps circulating. Portable applications legitimately run from USB, so allowlist known portable tools by signer and path rather than suppressing all removable-media execution; disabling AutoRun alone is not enough because Retadup relies on the user clicking a shortcut. Any hit is a likely worm infection on both the host and the drive.

Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)

ATT&CK: Initial Access, Lateral Movement → T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media); Execution → T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File)

Sources: Securelist (above), source article

Spawned System Process Injection Followed by HTTPS Payload Fetch

After persistence, the CoffeeLoader downloader starts one of dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe, injects itself, and from inside that process downloads the main body over HTTPS from a hardcoded C2 with a Firefox-style user agent; the response carries X-Signature and X-Content-MD5 headers, and only if the signature verifies against an embedded public key and the MD5 matches does it allocate executable memory and run the decrypted shellcode. The main CoffeeLoader module then talks to C2 with a binary protocol whose magic value changed from 0xC0FFEE42 to 0xD1D57871 and can inject, drop and run follow-on payloads. The detection logic correlates three events within a short window on one host: rundll32.exe (or the persisted DLL’s host process) creating one of those five system binaries, a cross-process memory write or remote thread into it, and an outbound HTTPS connection from that child to a host outside Microsoft’s own infrastructure.

Join EDR process creation, cross-process access or injection events (Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10) and network connection events (Sysmon Event ID 3 or EDR network telemetry). Baseline parents for each binary: dllhost.exe normally starts from svchost via DCOM, WerFault.exe from the faulting process or WerSvc, AtBroker.exe from accessibility settings, so rundll32 as parent is already rare. Do not suppress on process name, since the whole point is that the names are trusted; tune on parent and network destination. This correlation generalizes to most loaders that inject into spawned Windows binaries, and a hit should go straight to incident response with memory capture before reboot.

Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)

ATT&CK: Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation → T1055 (Process Injection); Command and Control → T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer)

Sources: Securelist (above), source article

Hash Appendix

CoffeeLoader (Retadup-delivered, 2026)

All MD5s come from the source article’s IoC section; Kaspersky published no SHA1 or SHA256 values and OTX AlienVault and VirusTotal were not queried, so those columns are marked not available. The DLL samples are patched copies of 7-Zip’s 7z.dll: block these hashes, not 7z.dll generally.

MD5s

2272dde17925d6179bea6fcf4d543d20  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
dce55eec553f6af16ba6481eaacb8638  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
449c9e8bc6eb308aa3c46c88959e1a4f  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
58886d45a0c5e802a5d0a7545c36112d  # NSIS installer -> drops 7z.dll to Temp and runs it via rundll32
cca710c5455c1fe2732771afbac16a09  # NSIS installer -> drops 7z.dll to Temp and runs it via rundll32

SHA1s

(not available)  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
(not available)  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
(not available)  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
(not available)  # NSIS installer -> drops 7z.dll to Temp and runs it via rundll32
(not available)  # NSIS installer -> drops 7z.dll to Temp and runs it via rundll32

SHA256s

(not available)  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
(not available)  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
(not available)  # 7z.dll (patched) -> CoffeeLoader DLL, Armoury-packed
(not available)  # NSIS installer -> drops 7z.dll to Temp and runs it via rundll32
(not available)  # NSIS installer -> drops 7z.dll to Temp and runs it via rundll32

References Appendix

  • “A USB worm’s second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader”, Securelist by Kaspersky (Oleg Kupreev), Nov. 16, 2026, https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/ (source article)
  • MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise technique pages linked above, MITRE, https://attack.mitre.org/

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