SignDrop Turns a Windows Security Fix Into a Path to SYSTEM
Researcher Nightmare Eclipse released SignDrop, a public Windows privilege-escalation exploit that abuses Microsoft's 2025 CLFS hardening and Defender to reach SYSTEM. No patch or CVE yet.
A Windows security fix from last year has become a way to get SYSTEM, and the exploit is already public. BleepingComputer reports that researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, also known as Nightmare Eclipse, has released SignDrop, a privilege-escalation zero-day that abuses the protections Microsoft added to the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver in October 2025. There’s no patch and no CVE yet. Naceri says the same trick can switch off antivirus and EDR tools.
For defenders
The bug: in October 2025 Microsoft started making CLFS create an authentication file (.cnpf) next to each new log file, to stop the memory-corruption attacks that had plagued the driver. Naceri says the access check is right when the log is created, but if a more privileged process opens the log later, CLFS writes the .cnpf file with that process’s SYSTEM rights. He gets Microsoft Defender to open the file (T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)). Because the write looks like it comes from the security product’s own process, he says it gets past any antimalware engine’s tamper protection, so it could be used to turn the product off (T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools)).
Who’s exposed: Naceri tested Windows 11 26H2 and the experimental builds of Windows 11 26H2 and Windows Server 2025, and he estimates 80% of Windows installs are vulnerable. A quick check is the registry value HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode: per Naceri, 0 (learning) or 1 (enforcement) means vulnerable.
Status: working PoC public (we don’t link it), no CVE, no Microsoft fix, and no in-the-wild exploitation reported so far. It’s a local bug, so an attacker needs code running on the machine first, which is exactly what ransomware crews already have once they’re in. Naceri warns against turning the CLFS mitigation off as a workaround, because that brings back the older memory-corruption attacks. He has dropped a run of Windows and Defender zero-days since April. Microsoft has fixed some of them, but not all.
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode = 0 or 1 (exposed, per Naceri)
.cnpf files created by an antimalware process in user-writable folders (suspicious)What it means for you
This won’t let anyone into your PC from the internet. It matters after something bad is already running, say a malicious download, because it lets that program take full control and possibly switch off your antivirus. There’s no patch yet, so the best defense is not running unknown programs in the first place.
Do this now
- Install Microsoft’s fix as soon as one ships. Watch for an out-of-band update or the December Patch Tuesday.
- Don’t disable the CLFS protection as a workaround. That reopens older, already-exploited bugs.
- Use a standard (non-admin) account for daily work, and don’t run downloads you didn’t ask for.
- Businesses: alert on the EDR or antivirus agent going quiet or being disabled, and on new SYSTEM shells started in user sessions.
Source article: New Windows SignDrop zero-day gives hackers SYSTEM privileges
Publisher: BleepingComputer
Published: Nov. 12, 2026
URL: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-windows-signdrop-zero-day-gives-hackers-system-privileges/
Executive Summary
Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, who publishes as Nightmare Eclipse and has released a string of Windows, Defender and BitLocker zero-days since April 2026, has published SignDrop, a public proof-of-concept local privilege escalation to SYSTEM that has no CVE and no Microsoft patch. No threat actor is tied to it and no in-the-wild exploitation has been reported, but public, unpatched Windows privilege escalations are routinely picked up by intrusion operators and ransomware affiliates who already have user-level code execution. SignDrop abuses the authentication mitigation Microsoft added to the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver in October 2025: when a new log file is created, CLFS creates a companion authentication file with the .cnpf extension, and while the access check on creation is correct, a log later opened by a more privileged process causes the .cnpf file to be created with that process’s SYSTEM rights. Naceri forces Microsoft Defender to open the log to win that write, and says the same approach defeats any antimalware engine’s self-protection, because the kernel sees the file operation coming from the engine’s own trusted process, which makes it usable to disable antivirus and EDR. He tested Windows 11 26H2 and experimental builds of Windows 11 26H2 and Windows Server 2025, estimates 80% of installations are vulnerable, and says systems whose CLFS Authentication Mode registry value is 0 (learning) or 1 (enforcement) are exposed; he advises against disabling the mitigation because that reopens the memory-corruption bugs it was built to stop. Hunt leads, false positive expectations and indicators are detailed below; no detection rules or file hashes were published.
ATT&CK chain: Privilege Escalation → Defense Evasion
Hunt Lead Grid
| Hunt Lead Level | Hunt Lead Name | ATT&CK | Risk of False Positives |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (Junior) | CLFS Authentication Mode Exposure Sweep | T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) | Low. This is an inventory of a single registry value, not an alert; the only judgment is which hosts to prioritize, anchored on the 0 and 1 values Naceri says are exposed. |
| 2 (Pro) | .cnpf Files Created by an Antimalware Process in User-Writable Folders | T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools) | Medium. Defender and other engines scan CLFS logs and legitimate applications create CLFS logs in their own folders; the lead anchors on .cnpf creation by the antimalware process inside user profile, temp or public folders shortly after a non-admin process created the matching log. |
| 3 (Elite) | SYSTEM Shell in a User Session After CLFS Activity | T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) | Medium. Installers, management agents and some drivers legitimately start SYSTEM processes; the lead correlates the CLFS file pattern with a new SYSTEM-integrity shell in an interactive user session whose ancestry does not run back to a known service. |
CLFS Authentication Mode Exposure Sweep
Naceri says SignDrop works wherever CLFS authentication is active, and gives the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode as the test: a value of 0 (learning mode) or 1 (enforcement mode) means the system is vulnerable. With no patch available, the first job is to know where the exposure is. The detection logic is an estate-wide query of that registry value, joined with OS build so you can see which Windows 11 26H2 and Windows Server 2025 systems carry it, and ranked by how much damage SYSTEM on that host would do (domain controllers, jump hosts, admin workstations, shared terminal servers first).
Collect the value with your endpoint management or EDR query capability, or a scheduled registry inventory, and repeat it weekly until Microsoft ships a fix so new builds are captured. Scope to every Windows endpoint and server. The output is a priority list, not a set of alerts, and it tells you where to deploy the two leads below and where to tighten local code execution controls such as application allowlisting. Changing the value to switch the mitigation off is the wrong response: Naceri warns that doing so reopens the CLFS memory-corruption bugs that were heavily exploited before October 2025. Do not run the public proof of concept on production systems to test exposure; the registry check gives the same answer without executing untrusted exploit code.
Hunt Lead Level: 1 (Junior Analyst)
ATT&CK: Privilege Escalation → T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)
Sources: “New Windows SignDrop zero-day gives hackers SYSTEM privileges”, BleepingComputer, Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-windows-signdrop-zero-day-gives-hackers-system-privileges/ (source article)
.cnpf Files Created by an Antimalware Process in User-Writable Folders
The core of SignDrop, as Naceri describes it, is that a low-privileged user creates a CLFS log, then forces a privileged process, in his proof of concept Microsoft Defender, to open it, so the .cnpf authentication file is created in the security context of that process with SYSTEM rights; from the kernel’s point of view the file operation comes from the antimalware engine itself, which is also why he says it slips past tamper protection. The behavioral anchor is therefore a .cnpf file (and the related .blf base log file) created or modified by the antimalware engine’s process, MsMpEng.exe for Defender or the equivalent engine process for third-party products, inside a user-writable location such as a user profile, %TEMP%, C:\Users\Public or C:\ProgramData subfolders, where that engine has no normal reason to create files. Raise severity when the matching .blf was created by a non-admin process in the same folder within minutes beforehand.
Use EDR file creation telemetry or Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) with the image path, and keep the creating process and user in the record. Baseline two weeks of .cnpf and .blf creation per process: legitimate CLFS users such as transactional file system components, some database engines and backup agents write logs in their own program folders, and that baseline will show which paths are normal. Allowlist by the signed image path of known CLFS writers and by folder, not by file extension. Because the technique impersonates the security product, do not rely on that product alone to report it; collect this telemetry from a second source if you can. A hit with a preceding user-created log in the same folder should be escalated and the host checked for the security agent being stopped or reconfigured, and the pattern generalizes to other abuses of trusted security processes for file writes.
Hunt Lead Level: 2 (Pro)
ATT&CK: Privilege Escalation → T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation); Defense Evasion → T1685 (Disable or Modify Tools)
Sources: BleepingComputer (above), source article
SYSTEM Shell in a User Session After CLFS Activity
Naceri’s demonstration ends with a SYSTEM command shell, and he says a SYSTEM shell from the proof of concept is the sign a host is vulnerable. In a real intrusion the payload will vary, but the end state is the same: a process running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM appears in, or is driven from, a standard user’s logon session without going through UAC or a known service. The correlation to build joins three events on one host within a short window: a non-admin process creating a CLFS .blf file in a user-writable folder; the antimalware engine creating the matching .cnpf file (the previous lead); and a new SYSTEM-integrity cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, conhost.exe or unsigned executable whose session ID is an interactive user session, or whose parent chain leads back to that user’s process tree rather than to services.exe, a management agent or an installer.
Use EDR process telemetry with integrity level, token user, session ID and parent chain, or Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command line logging plus Sysmon Event ID 1, combined with the file events above. Baseline 30 days of SYSTEM processes in user sessions, which will show a short list of legitimate sources (software deployment agents, printer and VPN helpers, some installers); allowlist those by signed image path and parent, never by process name, since an attacker can name a payload anything. Scope first to the high-value hosts from the exposure sweep. Hash-based blocking of the proof of concept is the wrong control because it is trivially recompiled. Any match on all three events is an escalation to incident response, and the SYSTEM-in-user-session pattern on its own is worth keeping as a standing detection for the next Windows privilege escalation as well.
Hunt Lead Level: 3 (Elite)
ATT&CK: Privilege Escalation → T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)
Sources: BleepingComputer (above), source article
Hash Appendix
No file hashes were published in the source article. The proof of concept is public source code that anyone can rebuild, so hashes of compiled copies would have little lasting value; detect the behavior instead.
References Appendix
- “New Windows SignDrop zero-day gives hackers SYSTEM privileges”, BleepingComputer, Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-windows-signdrop-zero-day-gives-hackers-system-privileges/ (source article; mechanism, tested builds, registry check, researcher statements)
- “Introduction to the Common Log File System”, Microsoft Learn, https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/introduction-to-the-common-log-file-system (background on CLFS)
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise technique pages linked above, MITRE, https://attack.mitre.org/